On June 2, 2025, the European Commission (EC) announced that it had fined food delivery companies Delivery Hero and Glovo a total of €329 million for participating in a cartel in the online food delivery sector in violation of Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).1
According to the EC, the companies leveraged Delivery Hero’s minority stake in Glovo and i) agreed not to poach each other’s employees, ii) exchanged commercially sensitive information, and iii) allocated geographic markets. Glovo’s fine was set at the statutory maximum, and both received a 10 percent fine reduction for acknowledging their participation in the cartel and agreeing to settle the case. The EC fined Delivery Hero €223.285 million, and Glovo €105.732 million.
This decision is groundbreaking, as it marks the EC’s first finding of a cartel in the labor market (no-poach agreement) and the first instance of the EC finding that cartel conduct was facilitated by a minority stake in a rival company.
Background
Delivery Hero and Glovo are large food delivery companies with activities in many Member States of the European Union, as well as globally. They deliver prepared foods, groceries, and other retail non-food products to customers who order online. In July 2018, Delivery Hero acquired a minority non-controlling stake in Glovo (reported to be 15 percent) and progressively increased this stake through subsequent investments. In July 2022, Delivery Hero acquired sole control over Glovo. The EC’s investigation was prompted by whistleblower information and information received from a national competition authority, resulting in unannounced inspections (so-called “dawn raids”) at the parties’ premises.
The Decision
The EC stated that, starting from Delivery Hero’s first acquisition of a minority shareholding in Glovo in July 2018, and until July 2022, the companies progressively removed competitive constraints between them and replaced competition with multilayered anticompetitive coordination, which included:
- Agreement not to poach each other’s employees. When Delivery Hero acquired a minority share in Glovo, its shareholders’ agreement included reciprocal no-hire clauses for certain employees. Shortly afterwards this was broadened to cover all employees, except delivery drivers/riders.
- Allocate geographic markets. The companies agreed to remove any geographic overlaps between them, avoided entering their respective national markets, and coordinated which of them should enter markets where neither had a presence yet. The EC found that Delivery Hero used its minority stake in Glovo to convince it to share markets in the European Economic Area in two ways: i) directly, by using or threatening to use its approval rights over specific decisions, and ii) indirectly, by influencing other Glovo shareholders.
- Exchange commercially sensitive information. The companies exchanged commercially sensitive information (e.g., on commercial strategies, prices, capacity, costs, or product characteristics), enabling them to coordinate their respective market activities. The EC found that the companies exchanged sensitive information beyond what was needed for a corporate investor to protect a financial investment.
Key Takeaways
This EC decision is notable as it constitutes the first formal decision (albeit in the form of a settlement) where the EC found that companies engaged in an agreement not to poach each other’s employees. Up to this date, only National Competition Authorities (NCAs) of the EU Member States have concluded antitrust investigations into no-poach agreements with formal decisions.2 Although the EC has signaled in the past that it believes that NCAs will be better-positioned to investigate no-poach agreements,3 this case proves that the EC is willing and able to pursue such matters where appropriate.
By comparison, the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Antitrust Division’s attempts to secure a criminal conviction for a no-poach agreement have so far been unsuccessful. The DOJ has had more success prosecuting agreements to fix employee wages. Notably, the DOJ recently convicted an individual at trial for agreeing to fix the wages for home healthcare nurses and for wire fraud.4 Despite some earlier setbacks, the DOJ is still actively pursuing labor-related agreements, including no-poach agreements and wage fixing.
Second, the decision is also notable for addressing the competition implications of a non-controlling minority shareholding in a competitor. In its press release, the EC stated: “Owning a stake in a competitor is not in itself illegal, but in this specific case it enabled anti-competitive contacts between the two rival companies at several levels. It also allowed Delivery Hero to obtain access to commercially sensitive information and to influence decision-making processes in Glovo, and ultimately to align the two companies’ respective business strategies. This shows that horizontal cross-ownership between competitors may raise antitrust risks and should be handled carefully.”
Companies with minority stakes in competitors, and in particular those that come with board representation, should take appropriate measures to prevent it being used to share competitively sensitive information or coordinate the companies’ commercial conduct. While some conduct may be permissible under EU antitrust rules, for example specific information shared to ensure that an investment decision is sound, or to protect key employees from being actively solicited, they must be clearly defined, narrowly tailored and objectively necessary, and should always be assessed by antitrust counsel. In this case, the EC clearly viewed the information exchanged by the parties as going far beyond what a minority shareholder would typically receive because of its investment.
The decision serves as a stark reminder of the care needed to ensure legitimate collaboration does not cross the line into a potential infringement. For any companies considering acquiring a stake in a competitor, it is crucial to put in place robust and well-documented safeguards to prevent problematic exchange of commercially sensitive information or other anticompetitive conduct. Standard clean team arrangements and strict protocols governing the flow and access to such information need to be vigorously applied. These measures are critical to ensure compliance during negotiations of an investment and throughout the duration of a non-controlling stake in a competitor.
At a press conference on June 2, 2025, Commissioner Teresa Ribera stated according to public reporting that the EC will pay attention to minority shareholdings, especially where a minority shareholder may have an interest in accessing commercially sensitive information. This underscores the growing enforcement focus on structural links between competitors, even in the absence of a control.
For more information, please contact Jindrich Kloub, Deirdre Carroll, Brent Snyder, Jeff VanHooreweghe, or another member of the global Antitrust and Competition practice at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati.
Jindrich Kloub, Deirdre Carroll, Karen Sharp, Julius Giesen, and Michelle Zang contributed to the preparation of this Wilson Sonsini Alert.
[1] See EC Press Release, Commission fines Delivery Hero and Glovo €329 million for participation in online food delivery cartel (June 2, 2025); see also EC, Remarks by Executive Vice-President Ribera on the adoption of a cartel settlement decision against Delivery Hero and Glovo (June 2, 2025).
[2] European countries who have penalized no-poach agreements include Belgium, Finland, France, Hungary, Lithuania, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
[3] See EC, “Competition Policy Brief - Antitrust in Labour Markets” (May 2024), p. 1; Politico, FairPlay Newsletter (May 27, 2025), quoting Maria Jaspers, Director for Cartels at DG COMP, at a panel discussion at the European Competition Day in Warsaw.
[4] See Wilson Sonsini Alert, “Perseverance Pays Off for DOJ in Labor Market Criminal Trial,” https://www.wsgr.com/en/insights/perseverance-pays-off-for-doj-in-labor-market-criminal-trial.html.
