On April 15, 2026, a federal jury found Live Nation liable for monopolization. The case was initially filed by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and joined by 40 attorneys general (AGs) from the states and the District of Columbia, but the DOJ reached a surprise mid-trial settlement limited to behavioral remedies. A broad coalition of 34 of the AG plaintiffs, from both political parties, rejected the federal settlement as inadequate and continued to litigate the case, culminating in a resounding verdict for the states on all counts tried.

States have long had the legal right to independently enforce the antitrust laws. But this verdict powerfully demonstrates the practical capabilities state AG offices have developed over the past several years, allowing them to obtain relief in complex, national-scale cases even without federal support. The upcoming remedies phase of the case may put an exclamation point on that demonstration as the state coalition seeks national structural relief, including a corporate breakup, notwithstanding the federal settlement.

This case holds several important lessons for firms managing antitrust investigations and government litigation:

• State AGs will be emboldened to act independently. The states’ choice to continue litigating this matter follows a trend of increasing assertiveness in antitrust matters spanning several years and across presidential administrations, including: the 2019 state coalition suit against the T-Mobile/Sprint merger over a federal settlement; independent investigations and lawsuits from AGs from California, the District of Columbia, and Washington against Amazon; state intervention in the HPE/Juniper settlement review; and a successful bid to pause the Nexstar/Tegna deal for litigation from the states despite federal approval. The Live Nation verdict, especially if boosted by what would be a monumental divestiture remedy, reinforces those cases and firmly establishes the states as a major independent enforcement axis.
• State coalitions have the resources to handle complex cases. While individual states may have limited resources, coalitions of states have demonstrated the ability to pool resources and effectively manage high-stakes national cases, including this one. This case also demonstrates the ability and inclination of state coalitions to leverage sophisticated outside counsel as a force multiplier (seen also in the T-Mobile/Sprint case). We expect this trend to continue and even accelerate, further boosting the credibility of state litigation threats.
• Settlement with federal agencies is not the end of the road. Firms can no longer rely on routine acceptance of settlements negotiated with the DOJ or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Controversial federal settlements can be expected to receive close scrutiny from judges, politicians, and state AGs. Firms must be sensitive to the multivariate interests of both state and federal enforcers and should consider multilateral engagement strategies from the outset. This is particularly so when unique local interests are at stake, but the Live Nation case shows that federal settlements are not necessarily the final word even in cases with a strong national character.
• State enforcement activity is not simply political. Independent state enforcement and pressure on federal enforcement decisions is not merely a political reaction from Democratic officials. AGs from both parties strongly criticized the federal settlement and joined the litigating coalition, citing the importance of protecting the interests of their citizens and the rule of law.

DOJ and Broad Group of States Collaborate to Bring Live Nation Case

Live Nation, a concert promotion company, and Ticketmaster, a ticketing company, agreed to merge in 2009. The deal attracted considerable criticism at the time, but it was cleared by the DOJ in 2010 with software licensing, divestiture, and anti-retaliation conditions. Broad public dissatisfaction with the deal, and with the combined company’s post-merger conduct, has simmered for years. It reached a tipping point in 2022-2023 following high-profile issues with availability of and high prices for tickets for a Taylor Swift tour, leading to a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee where a bipartisan array of senators termed Live Nation an illegal monopoly.

In May 2024, the DOJ, a broad group of state AGs, and the AG for the District of Columbia filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Enforcers alleged that Live Nation, through Ticketmaster and its other connected vertical businesses, had created a “flywheel” that entrenched the company’s dominant position across all aspects of the live music ecosystem. Specifically, enforcers alleged that Live Nation unlawfully acquired and maintained monopoly power by acquiring both established and nascent rivals, retaliating against potential entrants, retaliating against venues working with rivals, restricting artist access to venues, and entering into unlawful exclusive contacts with venues.

In February 2026, the court granted in part and denied in part Live Nation’s motion for summary judgment, clearing the case for trial. The court’s order narrowed the case somewhat, limiting it to allegations concerning promotion services for shows staged in a set of venues termed “large amphitheaters” as well as claims related to venue-facing ticketing markets. The order dismissed claims related to other markets, including promotion services in “major concert venues,” fan-facing ticketing services, and bookings.

Bipartisan State Coalition Rejects DOJ’s Unexpected Mid-Trial Settlement

The trial began in early March, led on the plaintiff side by DOJ attorneys. However, at the start of the second week of trial, on March 9, 2026, DOJ informed the court that it had reached a settlement with Live Nation the previous week, on March 5. The court excoriated DOJ and Live Nation for not disclosing the deal earlier and for not disclosing that the parties had been close to settlement prior to the beginning of trial, stressing that these failures “strain the bounds of responsible conduct.”

Concerns of possible political influence on the case had been brewing even before the surprise settlement announcement. In mid-February, after Gail Slater was reportedly pressed to resign from her position as Assistant Attorney General (AAG) for Antitrust, Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) and a group of six other Democratic Senators issued a letter to then AG Pam Bondi, warning that removing Slater appeared to clear the way for “Justice Department leadership to settle the case on terms favorable to the company, rather than fans, artists and independent venues.”

The circumstances and terms of the federal settlement provoked further criticism. The deal was struck the same day as a reported meeting with Live Nation at the White House. In addition, the terms of the settlement were apparently negotiated without direct involvement from the Antitrust Division’s trial team, and the agreement was not provided to the team in advance of public announcement; lead trial counsel and Acting Director of Civil Antitrust Litigation David Dahlquist told the court, “I only saw the term sheet when you did.” Acting Director Dahlquist has since announced plans to leave the DOJ.

The settlement term sheet is limited to behavioral remedies over an eight-year period. Under the deal, Live Nation and Ticketmaster must (among other things):

• offer an API allowing third-party ticketing marketplaces to use Ticketmaster’s back-end technology;
• offer nonexclusive primary ticketing contracts to major concert venues (as defined in the agreement);
• allow promoters to distribute 50 percent of tickets through other partners for Live Nation owned amphitheaters;
• cap service fees in Live Nation owned amphitheaters at 15 percent;
• terminate exclusive booking agreements with 13 amphitheaters across the country and refrain from reinitiating them;¹
• open access to owned-and-operated amphitheaters to non-affiliated artists;
• waive exclusive booking and co-promotion agreements with major concert venues and refrain from entering such agreements; and
• create a $280 million settlement fund.

The surprise settlement threw the trial into disarray as the state plaintiffs scrambled to evaluate the deal and reassess their strategy. Some state plaintiffs went so far as to move the court for a mistrial and a stay to allow time for negotiation and preparation for a potential retrial. Instead, the court pressed the state plaintiffs and Live Nation to negotiate in the courthouse over that week to try to reach a comprehensive deal. While some states joined the federal settlement, a group of 33 states and the District of Columbia were unable to reach accord with Live Nation. This coalition resumed litigating the case the next week, with newly hired outside counsel in the lead.

Both Republican and Democrat state AGs joined the litigating states coalition and repudiated the federal settlement. For example, Pennsylvania AG Dave Sunday, a Republican, stressed that “the settlement falls far short of protecting consumers” and that he was “continuing this case to hold Ticketmaster accountable and restore competition to the entertainment marketplace.” AG Jeff Jackson of North Carolina, a Democrat, described the federal settlement as “barely a slap on the wrist” that didn’t address the company’s simultaneous control of ticketing, performers, and venues. The bipartisan makeup of the coalition is significant, showing an independent push toward assertive state-level antitrust enforcement that cannot be dismissed solely as political opportunism.

States Win Resoundingly, but Remedies Remain a Key Test

On April 15, 2026, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the states, finding Live Nation liable on all surviving state and federal claims. The jury found that Live Nation had harmed competition in 33 states and the District of Columbia, including overcharging consumers in a subset of those jurisdictions an average of $1.72 per ticket. Live Nation has vowed to appeal the case and has renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law, stating that “the jury’s verdict is not the last word on this matter.”

Assuming that Live Nation’s post-trial motions are denied, the case will move to a separate remedies phase. The original complaint in the case took an aggressive remedies position, calling expressly for the divestiture of Ticketmaster, and it is expected that the states will continue to press for structural, behavioral, and monetary penalties that substantially exceed the terms of the federal settlement. Again, both Republican and Democratic AGs have taken strong stances. Republican AG Ken Paxton of Texas, who notably held himself out as one of the leaders of the coalition, stressed a commitment to “pursue every possible remedy under the law to hold the company accountable.” Democrat AG Phil Weiser of Colorado stated: “State attorneys general stood strong and continued this case without the federal government because we believed that concertgoers deserved a fair trial and a fair deal. Live Nation is being held to account for violating state and federal antitrust laws, and I’ll continue to fight to break up their monopoly, restore competition, and get money back for concertgoers.”

For a state coalition to be in the position of petitioning for a national breakup of a major corporation in a monopolization case is itself significant; actually obtaining that relief would be truly historic. However, the states may face an uphill battle. Judges in other monopolization cases have been reluctant to order break ups as an antitrust remedy. In the Google Search case, the court rejected the DOJ’s requests for divestiture of Chrome and Android, citing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Microsoft, which held that “divestiture is a remedy that is imposed only with great caution, in part because its long-term efficacy is rarely certain.”

The circumstances of this case provide additional hurdles for the states. The summary judgment order narrowing the case to just a few of the markets originally alleged in the complaint may weaken the states’ case for broad structural remedies like a Ticketmaster divestiture. Moreover, the terms of the federal settlement, even if controversial, unavoidably set an anchor that may allow Live Nation to “litigate the fix,” a strategy that has been very successful in merger cases in recent years. The states must also contend with reports that, prior to former AAG Slater’s resignation, the Antitrust Division proposed settlement terms that would have included divestiture of a “significant number” of the 50-60 large amphitheaters actually owned by Live Nation—another potential anchor point on which Live Nation could seek to fix the court’s attention.

On the other hand, judges appear to be growing increasingly skeptical of federal settlements in antitrust cases. In the 2019 T-Mobile/Sprint merger case, another matter litigated independently by a coalition of states following federal settlement, the court credited federal approvals and consent orders in refusing to enjoin the merger. By contrast, the HPE/Juniper settlement is currently subject to a high-profile Tunney Act review, in which the court has taken the extraordinary steps of allowing states challenging the deal to intervene as parties and receive additional discovery. A federal court also recently enjoined the Nexstar/Tegna merger pending a state challenge, notwithstanding unconditional approval from federal authorities. In this case, the same group of Klobuchar-led Democratic senators (less Senator Dick Durbin, D-IL) have already urged the court to take a searching look at the federal settlement before approving it. Whether and how the court will assess the federal settlement in the remedies phase of the trial and, separately, in a Tunney Act review remains to be seen.

For more information about this verdict or its implications, please contact any member of Wilson Sonsini’s Antitrust and Competition practice.

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[1] Although the term sheet presented by DOJ states that Live Nation would divest the venues themselves, Live Nation’s press release clarifies that it is divesting exclusive agreements for venues that are not owned and operated by the company.