In a closely watched case with major implications for class action litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court sidestepped a long-simmering legal question: Can a class be certified if it includes members who suffered no injury? On June 5, 2025, by a vote of 8-1, the Court dismissed Labcorp v. Davis as improvidently granted, leaving unresolved a longstanding circuit split on the issue. But while the dismissal frustrates those hoping for clarity, both the oral argument and Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s pointed dissent reveal a Court still keenly interested in the issue—and likely waiting for a cleaner vehicle to address it.

Background

Labcorp is a life sciences company that provides laboratory services to healthcare providers. After the company implemented self-service kiosks at more than 90 percent of its locations, a putative class of blind patients sued, alleging that Labcorp offered no accessibility options for these kiosks.¹ Labcorp responded that many of its blind patients were uninjured, as they were helped at the front desk and preferred to check-in that way rather than via the kiosk.

In 2022, the district court certified a class (and damages subclass) comprising “[a]ll legally blind individuals who visited a LabCorp patient service center with a LabCorp Express Self-Service kiosk ….”² Labcorp appealed the class certification ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.³ But before the Ninth Circuit resolved the appeal, the district court twice amended the class definition.⁴ Labcorp never appealed the amended class definitions (the parties disputed whether the amendments were material such that an amended appeal was required by the Ninth Circuit’s rules). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the original certification and class definition.

Labcorp then sought certiorari.

The Supreme Court Case

The Supreme Court granted review on the following question: “Whether a federal court may certify a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) when some members of the proposed class lack any Article III injury.”⁵ According to Labcorp’s petition for certiorari, the federal circuits are split on this question. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second and the Eighth Circuits disallow classes containing any members that lack standing.⁶ The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First, Third, and D.C. Circuits permit a certified class to contain a de minimis number of uninjured class members, provided there is some administratively feasible way to identify and exclude them.⁷ And the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits permit the certification of classes with some uninjured members and instead defer questions of standing.⁸

At the merits-stage, Labcorp argued that both Article III and Rule 23(b)(3) prevent certification of a class that includes uninjured class members.⁹ Labcorp stressed both that every plaintiff must have Article III standing and that a class “saturated” with uninjured members defeats the predominance requirement for class certification. Labcorp contended that the class definition included blind patients who lacked any interest in using the kiosks and were thus uninjured. The U.S. supported LabCorp’s position that Rule 23(b)(3) bars certification of a class that includes a significant number of uninjured class members, but took no position on the Article III issue.

The class plaintiffs responded that the appeal was moot because Labcorp appealed only the May certification order despite “material” changes in later amendments. On the merits, the plaintiffs contended that requiring the exclusion of any absent class member without standing at the certification stage would disrupt class action practice and essentially require fail-safe class definitions. Further, they maintained that Rule 23(b)(3) is not a quantitative assessment requiring the exclusion of uninjured members. Rather, a class definition satisfies predominance so long as uninjured members can be identified and excluded.¹⁰

Much of the oral argument was spent on questions about the mootness issue, but the parties and several Justices also focused on Rule 23(b)(3) predominance and the need for an administratively feasible method to identify and exclude uninjured members. The parties primarily parted ways over whether this method had to be identified before or after class certification.

Dismissal as Improvidently Granted

On June 5, 2025, the Supreme Court dismissed Labcorp’s petition as improvidently granted, but without issuing a written majority opinion.¹¹ Justice Kavanaugh dissented, and his opinion suggests that the dismissal was based on mootness grounds. In his view, the case was not moot and the Court should have reached the merits and held that “a federal court may not certify a damages class that includes both injured and uninjured members.”¹² The reason, he explained, is that classes with uninjured members fail the predominance requirement, and including uninjured members can improperly “coerce businesses into costly settlements.” Justice Kavanaugh would have left open the question whether a class may be certified with a de minimis number of uninjured members if “some identified mechanism exists to manageably remove those uninjured members.”¹³

Conclusion

Although the Supreme Court passed on resolving the critical question of uninjured class members in Labcorp v. Davis, the issue remains far from settled. The dismissal—likely grounded in mootness—signals not lack of interest, but caution. And as Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent underscores, including uninjured members can have profound implications for class certification and settlement leverage. When the right case arrives, the Court seems poised to weigh in on the merits.

Please reach out to Jeffrey Bank, Steffen Johnson, Bonnie Lau, Brian Smith, or another member of Wilson Sonsini’s Antitrust and Competition practice or Supreme Court and Appellate practice with questions regarding any of the discussion above.

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[1] Davis v. Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, No. 2:20-cv-893-FMO-KS (C.D. Cal.).

[2] Order Granting Motion to Certify Class, ECF. No. 97, No. 2:20-cv-893 (C.D. Cal.).

[3] Davis v. Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, No. 22-55873 (9th Cir.).

[4] Amended Order Granting Motion to Certify Class, ECF. No. 103, 2:20-cv-893-FMO-KS (C.D. Cal.); Order Granting Motion to Refine Class Definition, ECF. No. 114, 2:20-cv-893-FMO-KS (C.D. Cal.).

[5] Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Davis, No. 24-304 (S. Ct.).

[6] Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[N]o class may be certified that contains members lacking Article III standing.”); Avritt v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 1023, 1034 (8th Cir. 2010).

[7] In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2018); In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 464 F. Supp. 3d 678, 720–21 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (citing Asacol); In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 292 F. Supp. 3d 14, 135 (D.D.C. 2017).

[8] Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 757 (7th Cir. 2014); Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 F.4th 651, 669 (9th Cir. 2022); Cordoba v. DIRECTV, LLC, 942 F.3d 1259, 1276–77 (11^thCir. 2019).

[9] Brief for Petitioner, 24-304 (S. Ct.).

[10] Brief for Respondents, 24-304 (S. Ct.).

[11] Order Dismissing Writ of Certiorari as Improvidently Granted, 24-304 (S. Ct.).

[12] Opinion Dissenting from Dismissal of Writ, 24-304 (S. Ct.).

[13] Id. at 5 n.1.