With new and novel tariffs yielding to court decisions rendering those tariffs unlawful (only to be replaced with newer tariffs—and more litigation about the newer tariffs), and with the Section 122 temporary import surcharge of 10 percent nearing expiration in a matter of weeks, businesses have faced extraordinary uncertainty in navigating trade policy.

June has been no exception. The beginning of the month was a particularly active one on the tariff front, with several significant updates. These actions span the full gamut of government action from new tariff proposals (potential successors to the Section 122 tariffs), to revived IEEPA tariff litigation appeals, to new enforcement policy pronouncements. Below, we highlight the relevant changes stemming from these actions, their practical implications, and what they may signal about the administration’s evolving tariff strategy.

U.S. Trade Representative Proposes 10-12.5 Percent Section 301 Tariffs to Remedy Forced Labor Enforcement Shortfalls

On June 2, 2026, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) published a significant report regarding the imposition and effective enforcement of forced labor standards by U.S. trading partners, which USTR characterized as being globally inadequate. As a result, USTR issued a notice of proposed actions to implement new Section 301 tariffs of 10 to 12.5 percent on all U.S. trading partners in the near future to address these inadequacies.

1. The proposed lower 10 percent rate would apply to trading partners that currently have forced labor import prohibitions as well as countries that have promised to address forced labor concerns through reciprocal trade agreements executed with the U.S. over the past year, including Argentina, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Canada, Ecuador, El Salvador, the European Union (EU), Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom (UK).
2. All other investigated countries would be subject to a proposed higher 12.5 percent rate, including Algeria, Angola, Australia, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Brazil, Chile, the People’s Republic of China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, China, India, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Peru, the Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Vietnam.

Comments on the proposed actions are being accepted through July 6, 2026, with USTR particularly interested in comments regarding (1) whether an increase in the proposed rates of duty is warranted, (2) potential exclusions, and (3) whether a special mechanism should exist for textile items.

While no new tariffs are yet in effect, and it remains to be seen whether and how these Section 301 forced labor tariffs will be implemented, this legal mechanism could represent an imminent and more durable successor to the 10 percent “temporary import surcharge” that has been levied under Section 122 and is scheduled to expire in late July.

Additional Section 301 tariff investigations, such as those related to “excess structural capacity” in certain U.S. trading partner economies, remain underway and could add to importers’ total tariff burdens if or when additional tariffs are imposed.

Government Appeals Court of International Trade Order Mandating Widespread and Automatic IEEPA Tariff Relief

After the U.S. Supreme Court decision in February 2026 determined that the tariffs imposed by the U.S. government since February 2025 under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) were unlawful, the case returned to the Court of International Trade (CIT), which was assigned responsibility for overseeing the provision of relief in accordance with the Supreme Court’s order. In April, the U.S. government subsequently began refunding importers for certain “reciprocal” and “fentanyl-related” tariffs paid to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) over the course of the year the tariffs were in effect. Importers have already submitted refund requests through the Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries (CAPE) system for 15 million customs entries and refunds of over $20 billion dollars have already been approved, with tens of billions in additional refunds being processed in the current wave of entries eligible for submission through CAPE.

However, in ongoing litigation related to those tariffs before the CIT, the Department of Justice (DOJ) in a recent appeal indicated its rejection of one of the core premises of the CIT’s order: namely, that the CIT was authorized to order the government to provide refunds to all importers. Specifically, language in the DOJ mandamus petition to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (regarding whether the CIT can compel a senior, Senate-confirmed CBP official to testify regarding the status of the refunds) asserts that Senior Judge Eaton’s orders prescribing “universal injunctive relief” are “plainly unlawful under Trump v. Casa, Inc. 606 U.S. 831 (2025)” and indicates that the government understands its thus-issued refunds to have been processed voluntarily by CBP rather than pursuant to CIT order. This challenge comes as both the government and CIT appear to be increasingly at odds with each other regarding the pace of the CBP refunds.

The net result of this extended litigation could be additional delay and uncertainty regarding whether and when the government will process remaining refund requests, including those scheduled for inclusion in future expansions of the CAPE platform.

Section 232, U.S-Brazil, and U.S.-China Trade Updates

The government also made the following notable tariff-related actions earlier this month:

1. More Tweaks to Sec. 232 Metals Tariffs: The U.S. government adjusted the Section 232 tariffs on certain steel, aluminum, and copper products, providing tariff relief to some parties with a reduced tariff rate of 15 percent (compared to 25 percent previously), particularly for agricultural, industrial equipment, and HVAC equipment. Additional favorable provisions were extended to parties that have recently signed trade deals with the United States, including the UK, EU, Switzerland, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and several Latin American countries. These reductions follow a more significant update in early April 2026 that we wrote about previously.
2. Update on Brazil Sec. 301 Investigation: Like the broader forced labor report discussed above, the USTR also published a new Section 301 determination regarding the trade practices and policies of Brazil, finding that Brazil’s tariff policies, digital trade and electronic payment services policies, lax anti-corruption enforcement, and inadequate intellectual property protection discriminate against or unfairly disadvantage U.S. businesses. In response, USTR proposes a new 25 percent tariff on most Brazilian goods (with certain exceptions). Though subject to further changes during the notice-and-comment rulemaking process, this represents a further step towards solidifying tariffs targeting Brazil, which were previously imposed under IEEPA at levels as high as 40 percent beginning in August 2025 (before the IEEPA tariffs were rescinded in February 2026).
3. USTR Request for Comment re Policies to Encourage Reciprocal and Balanced Trade with China: Finally, USTR issued a request for comments regarding potential policies and legal mechanisms that USTR can consider in negotiations with China regarding trade matters as the work of the U.S.-China Board of Trade—a key institution commissioned from the bilateral trade discussions between the U.S. and China over the past year—is defined. Comments may be submitted by interested parties through July 10, 2026.

Executive Order on Customs Enforcement Signals that Pressures Will Continue

The Trump administration on Friday, June 5, 2026, issued a new Strengthening Customs Enforcement executive order directing CBP to further prioritize enforcement of customs laws (the Customs Enforcement EO), with particular emphasis on implementing measures to backstop U.S. government revenue interests associated with U.S. imports completed by foreign and foreign-affiliated parties, heavier scrutiny on the U.S. customs brokers servicing those importers, and stricter minimum punishments for customs violations. The Customs Enforcement EO is an emphatic expression of, and the latest in a long series of, enforcement-forward changes for CBP, which has continued growing its ranks despite the recent, historically lengthy Department of Homeland Security shutdown.

Still, the Customs Enforcement EO introduces new concepts and provisions that will need to be monitored as they are implemented by CBP. For example:

1. The broad redefinition of “foreign importers of record” (foreign IORs) subjected to heightened enforcement under the new executive order could capture a broader swath of foreign entities, including subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals. U.S. parties that rely on foreign suppliers/merchants to complete import might face significant new disruptions in their supply chains if enforcement against those foreign IORs advances substantially.
2. Customs brokers and freight forwarders servicing those foreign IORs are also advised that they will be subjected to “maximum penalties” for failing to conduct due diligence, repeatedly representing noncompliant clients, and/or failing to cooperate with CBP information requests. This is a notable escalation of pressure and threatens to further burden customs brokers and supply chain professionals at a time when they are similarly stressed with frequent customs-related updates.
3. The invention of a “good standing” requirement for importers introduces room for CBP to evaluate importers—including potentially, on the basis of even very distant affiliates’ actions—in ways that might not comport with traditional due process norms.
4. The elimination of CBP discretion to provide for a minimum penalty of less than 50 percent of the statutory penalty for violations could potentially result in higher stakes enforcement challenges. Parties may find it more difficult to justify pursuing voluntary disclosures, or otherwise settling matters regarding actual or potential customs violations if there is less chance for favorable mitigation, potentially resulting in more litigation.
5. The push for importer certifications of compliance with statutes beyond the remit of Customs matters, such as the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), could result in parties being obligated to be dramatically more transparent about ownership, supply chain, and other attributes to the U.S. government than previously necessary.

The weight of this policy statement will primarily be seen as CBP implements these changes in the coming months and years. Note, too, that the Customs Enforcement EO also tees up the possibility of engagement with U.S. Congress to pass new customs enforcement legislation, suggesting an intent to implement broad overhauls beyond the executive branch.

What This Means

The above actions indicate that the government is still firing on all cylinders as it seeks to carry out its tariff agenda. For those hoping for a quiet retreat in the face of legal setbacks earlier this year, this month’s developments indicate that such an outcome is unlikely as the administration continues to rebuild a more durable tariff wall and works through the procedural regulatory requirements to realize that goal. Like the Section 122 tariffs that are scheduled to expire next month—which have already been determined unlawful by the CIT, whose decision has already been appealed, and which will likely expire before the litigation fully resolves—these represent new ways for the government to implement tariffs less susceptible to legal challenge.

Please reach out to Josephine Aiello LeBeau, Anne Seymour, Bryan Poellot or another member of Wilson Sonsini’s National Security and Trade practice with questions regarding any of the matters discussed above.