The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has taken another step toward standardizing corporate crime enforcement by adopting a department-wide Corporate Enforcement Policy (DOJ CEP). This client alert summarizes the new DOJ CEP and analyzes how companies can expect corporate criminal resolutions to proceed under this new unified policy.

Announcing Department-Wide Corporate Enforcement Policy

On March 10, 2026, the DOJ released the Department-wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy for criminal matters. In announcing the “first-ever” Department-wide policy, Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche stressed the DOJ’s commitment to transparency and fairness. The updated CEP applies to all corporate criminal cases brought by the DOJ, except for antitrust cases. Although this policy applies across the entire DOJ, it is almost identical to the DOJ Criminal Division’s existing Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (Criminal Division CEP).

The DOJ CEP describes the DOJ’s policies and encourages companies to self-disclose misconduct. The DOJ CEP also highlights the importance of companies’ investments in effective compliance programs. With the DOJ CEP applying Department-wide, the policy provides greater clarity regarding the expectations and incentives for companies to consider when deciding whether to self-disclose and more predictability for companies that are under investigation.

New Policy, Same Procedure

This new policy will likely not change much for companies under investigation. Before the DOJ CEP was issued, different components of the DOJ had different corporate enforcement policies, but they were all similar—if companies self-disclosed, cooperated, and remediated, they would usually receive a declination and avoid paying a fine, but still pay restitution. There were some differences between different components’ respective policies (e.g., the Criminal Division’s CEP guaranteed companies lower fines if they had a “near miss” voluntary self-disclosure while the U.S. Attorneys Offices’ voluntary self-disclosure policy did not), but those differences were minor.

The DOJ CEP harmonizes the agency’s approach: if companies follow the guidelines set forth in the DOJ CEP, the DOJ promises that they will face reduced consequences for criminal misconduct, and the DOJ may even decline to prosecute. And it sets forth a three-track framework for possible resolutions: 1) Declinations, 2) Near Misses, and 3) Other Resolutions.

Outlining the Three Resolutions Under the DOJ CEP

To receive a Declination (a “Part I” resolution), a company is expected to:

1. voluntarily self-disclose misconduct to an “appropriate” DOJ criminal component;
2. fully cooperate;
3. timely and appropriately remediate; and
4. not have any aggravating circumstances.¹

If a company self-discloses in good faith, but either has aggravating factors or fails to meet the DOJ’s voluntary self-disclosure requirements, it will be eligible for a Near Miss (a “Part II” resolution). For Part II resolutions, parties receive a Non-Prosecution Agreement with a term of less than three years, no monitor, and a fine reduction calculated from the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range. The Criminal Division CEP provided for fine reductions of 75 percent, but the new policy dictates a reduction of at least 50 percent, and not more than 75 percent.

The DOJ CEP defines voluntary self-disclosure to be:

1. a good faith disclosure to the appropriate criminal component;
2. of misconduct not previously known to the DOJ;
3. where the company had no preexisting obligation to disclose the misconduct to the DOJ;
4. made “prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation”; and
5. made within a reasonably prompt time after becoming aware of the misconduct, with the burden being on the company to demonstrate timeliness of the voluntary self-disclosure.

If a company does not self-disclose in good faith or has aggravating factors, the case will be an Other Resolution (a “Part III” resolution) which gives the DOJ discretion to decide the form of a resolution—up to a guilty plea—and whether to impose a monitor. A Part III resolution also limits any fine reduction to no more than 50 percent from the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range.

Main Justice CEP Trumps Office-Specific Policies

The DOJ CEP incorporates the core components of the Criminal Division’s CEP and expands them across the entire DOJ. So, most cases will result in companies having the same outcome as they would have before the DOJ CEP was issued, but some companies—including those with “Near Miss” self-disclosures—could have better outcomes. The DOJ CEP provides predictability because it supersedes all component-specific or U.S. Attorney’s Office-specific corporate enforcement policies currently in effect, except in antitrust cases. It is not clear, however, whether U.S. Attorney’s Offices will have future discretion to create their own self-disclosure policies, like the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York’s recently issued policy.

For more information on the CEP, how to establish or bolster your company’s compliance program and internal controls, how to respond to a government investigation, or any related matter, please contact a member of Wilson Sonsini’s White Collar Crime, Government Investigations, National Security and Trade, or Antitrust and Competition practices.

---

[1] Expanded definitions of each of these terms are in the DOJ CEP’s appendix.