“NO ECONOMIC SENSE” MAKES NO SENSE FOR EXCLUSIVE DEALING

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Exclusive Dealing Agreements: A New Frontier in Antitrust Litigation?

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I. INTRODUCTION

Exclusive dealing is typically output-enhancing. Sellers can pursue exclusive dealing agreements to achieve dedicated distribution, to avoid free riding, or to assure a customer sales base sufficient to achieve economies of scale. Buyers, correspondingly, may seek out exclusive arrangements to encourage competitive bidding among their suppliers, to secure a supply of sufficient quantity, or to ensure receipt of high quality products from a known source. There are numerous equally valid reasons for exclusives as well. And the benefits to consumer welfare can be significant. Yet, on occasion, exclusive dealing arrangements can also serve to maintain or extend significant market power and, in the process, cause substantial consumer harm. Sound antitrust policy requires care in distinguishing the ordinary, procompetitive arrangements from those that harm consumers.

Exclusive dealing arrangements are among the practices subject to challenge, not just as unreasonable restraints under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act, but also as exclusionary or anticompetitive conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In the
broader context of what constitutes an unlawful practice under Section 2, there has been considerable recent academic debate surrounding the appropriate standard by which to determine whether conduct is exclusionary. Some commentators have suggested profitability-focused tests, mainly the “no economic sense” test\(^2\) and the “profit sacrifice” test,\(^3\) as alternatives to the more traditional consumer welfare effect standard.\(^4\) Others have concluded that there is no one-size-fits-all test under Section 2 because different kinds of exclusionary conduct demand different methods of analysis.\(^5\)

Advocates of the no economic sense test would find conduct illegal under Section 2 only if the “conduct likely would [not] have been profitable if the existing competitors were not excluded and monopoly was not created” or if the conduct “likely would [not] have been profitable if the nascent competition flourished and the monopoly was not maintained.”\(^6\)

Exclusive dealing is one of the many types of conduct that would be governed by the “no

\(^2\) See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The “No Economic Sense” Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 1-3, on file with authors).

\(^3\) See A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary Conduct—Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript on file with authors); A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws: Balancing, Sacrifice, and Refusals to Deal, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247, 1255 (2005); Mark Patterson, The Sacrifice of Profits in Non-Price Predation, 18 ANTITRUST 37, 37 (Fall 2003).


\(^5\) See Kenneth Glazer & Abbott Lipsky, Unilateral Refusals to Deal Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 749 (1995); Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, the Rule of Reason, and the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 3, on file with authors); Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies By Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 52-66 (2004). The consumer welfare or rule of reason test, as articulated by Professor Salop and endorsed here, has a similar effect—with the analysis varying based on the specific facts of the case at hand to determine whether consumers have been or will be harmed. See Part V below.

\(^6\) Werden, supra note 2, at 4.
economic sense” test according to its main proponents. Some advocates even that contend that the test—or its “profit sacrifice” variant—should have near universal application to all conduct challenged under Section 2.7

The no economic sense test is problematic when applied to exclusive dealing. Unlike some other types of conduct subject to challenge under Section 1 or Section 2, exclusive dealing is a practice that almost always is accompanied by some efficiency justification.8 The presence of efficiencies, coupled with the occasionally minimal costs associated with an exclusive dealing scheme, suggests that an exclusive arrangement will typically make at least some “economic sense” to the defendant. But the way in which those efficiencies are achieved, and thus confer economic benefits on the defendant, is precisely through the mechanism of exclusion—the elimination of rivals’ competition for the duration of the exclusive arrangement. The application of the “no economic sense” test to exclusive dealing is therefore unintelligible. In most cases, there is no way to separate the economic benefit to the defendant from the exclusionary impact on rivals. The relevant question for exclusive dealing is not whether it “makes economic sense” (because it so frequently does), but whether, on balance, the specific arrangements at issue are

7 See A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws: Balancing, Sacrifice, and Refusals to Deal, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247, 1255 (2005); cf. Werden, supra note 2, at ___ (noting that the no economic sense test does have its limitations). The Department of Justice, in supporting the petition for a writ of certiorari in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004), encouraged application of the no economic sense test as a general standard for defining exclusionary conduct under Section 2. The government advocated that “[c]onduct is ‘exclusionary’ or ‘predatory’ in antitrust jurisprudence if the conduct would not make economic sense for the defendant but for its elimination or softening of competition.” Brief for the United States and FTC as Amici Curiae, at 10, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200500/200558.pdf. However, in the joint brief filed by the Department and the Federal Trade Commission on the merits of the case, the argument was narrower, urging use of the test in contexts where the defendant was being asked to provide access to its own assets to a rival. Brief on the Merits of the United States and FTC as Amici Curiae, at 15-20, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201000/201048.pdf.

likely to raise prices, reduce output, or otherwise harm consumers. The no economic sense test declines that inquiry.

Without wading too far in this paper into the overall Section 2 standards debate, or attempting to compare the merits of the numerous approaches proposed to date, this article makes the modest observation that, when analyzing exclusive dealing arrangements, the no economic sense and profit sacrifice tests—which find their roots in judging whether or not pricing conduct is predatory—inevitably will fail to condemn at least some seriously anticompetitive exclusive dealing arrangements and run the risk of condemning benign ones. As noted by Professor Gavil, the no economic sense test

focuses exclusively on the incentives of the dominant firm, largely ignoring the effects of its conduct on rivals or consumers. As a consequence, it seemingly would credit any efficiency gains to the monopolist as a complete defense to charges of monopolization. It would disregard the amount of those gains and the degree to which the challenged conduct also may have resulted in significant anticompetitive effects on rivals and consumers. There would be no “weighing” or “balancing.”

\footnote{Gavil, supra note 5 at 52-53 (footnote omitted). Some proponents of the “no economic sense” test vigorously deny that the test makes any efficiency gain to the defendant a complete defense. \textit{See} Werden, supra note 2. As applied by careful professionals such as Dr. Werden, that may well be true. But the legerdemain required to demonstrate that an exclusive that yields some efficiencies nevertheless makes no economic sense is considerable. And in the hands of busy courts, heavy skepticism is warranted; most will simply conclude that, if the conduct generates some efficiency, it makes enough “sense” to pass. Moreover, as applied by the more sophisticated no economic sense test advocates, their test essentially nets out the expected exclusionary effect (and benefit) against the efficiency gain at the stage of determining whether the conduct “makes economic sense”—while refusing the same inquiry in assessing the net effect on competition. \textit{Id.} The upshot is that the no economic sense test, correctly applied, points directionally towards the same outcome as the rule of reason anyway (and is no less complicated in application). Where the proponents of the test fall completely short is in explaining why it is better to engage in balancing and netting in evaluating the profitability of the conduct to the defendant than in evaluating the impact on consumers. Antitrust cares about consumer welfare directly; it cares about profitability and incentives only as means to the consumer welfare end.}
In the exclusive dealing context, the no economic sense test risks false positives as well. Proof of actual or probable adverse effects on competition is not required, allowing condemnation of conduct that appears unprofitable but for its impact on rivals but that, at the same time, portends no risk of consumer harm.

Any appropriate analysis of exclusive dealing must look beyond the narrow focus of the no economic sense test. In evaluating exclusive dealing, the rule of reason looks at not just the potentially predatory conduct, but also the market conditions that make it possible and the consumer welfare consequences that it produces. The analysis is straightforward—the traditional inquiries into power, effect, and justification. That means a demonstration by the plaintiff of market power in a relevant market to ascertain whether consumer harm is even possible; proof of an impairment of rivals sufficient to reduce, materially, the constraints on the defendant’s market power and thus effectuate consumer harm; an analysis of the defendant’s efficiency justifications for the exclusive arrangements; and, where necessary, a comparison of the harms and benefits to determine the net impact on competition.10

The ultimate question in any antitrust case is the effect on consumers. The no economic sense test advocates have failed to demonstrate why that same consumer welfare effect inquiry should not be the focus of analysis in exclusive dealing cases. Although the no economic sense test has significant value in a number of contexts, it cannot serve as the only test for all Section 2 cases—and is particularly ill-suited as a test for evaluating exclusive dealing arrangements.11

10 See Jacobson, supra note 8, at 368-69; Gavil, supra note 5, at 61-63; Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 4, at 213, 283.

11 The no economic sense test will generate correct results from time to time. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), is often cited—correctly—as a case where the defendant’s conduct made no economic sense, helped maintain monopoly power, and was properly condemned. But condemnation under that test would have been nothing more than a fortunate accident,
II. **THE NO ECONOMIC SENSE AND PROFIT SACRIFICE TESTS**

It is important to understand the purposefully narrow origins of the no economic sense test to help explain why the test has limited applicability beyond the context of predatory pricing and refusals to deal with a horizontal rival.

The “no economic sense” test is rooted in the framework first articulated by Professors Areeda and Turner in 1975 for evaluating whether unilateral pricing decisions violate Section 2. Although Areeda and Turner introduced the broad outlines of the test using quite general language—“the classically-feared case of predation has been the deliberate sacrifice of present revenues for the purposes of driving rivals out of the market and then recouping the losses through higher profits earned in the absence of competition”—their articulation of the test was specific to the context of unilateral pricing decisions. This was their thesis in the 1975 article, as well as in their original treatise and its subsequent revisions.

In their articulation of the predatory pricing test, Areeda and Turner set forth the now familiar architecture that “predatory pricing would make little economic sense to a potential predator unless he had (1) greater financial staying power than his rivals, and (2) a very substantial prospect that the losses he incurs in the predatory campaign will be exceeded by the profits to be earned after his rivals have been destroyed.” The then unique and rigorous

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13 *Id.* at 698.

14 *See, e.g.,* 3 PHILIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, Ch.7C-1 (2d ed. 2002).

marginal cost pricing framework was developed for predatory pricing situations because Professors Areeda and Turner believed that anything less stringent potentially would result in excessive judicial intervention with pricing decisions that are almost always procompetitive and essential to competition. Thus, Areeda and Turner prefaced their discussion of predatory pricing by noting how rare the practice is, with a consequent need to take “extreme care” in formulating any rule against it “lest the threat of litigation, particularly by private parties, materially deter legitimate, competitive pricing.”\(^\text{16}\) The “no economic sense” test therefore was developed for the specific purpose of judging one type of conduct. Price competition was in a different category from other practices, and the test was premised on that distinction.\(^\text{17}\)

Today, some commentators encourage a wider application for the test, casting aside its narrow theoretical and historical moorings. In its most general formulation, their test makes exclusionary conduct unlawful if it makes sense only because of the prospect of excluding rivals and enhancing market power.\(^\text{18}\) This test, its proponents urge, ensures that leading firms retain unimpeded incentives to compete vigorously by condemning conduct only when its

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\(^\text{16}\) Id. at 699. In contrast, the extensive discussion of exclusive dealing in the current edition of the treatise characterizes exclusive dealing arrangements as presenting “only limited threats of competitive harm, and then only under carefully defined conditions,” 11 PHILIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW \(\S\) 1820, at 161 (2d ed. 2002), and concludes by suggesting an analysis that looks first at market structure, power, and exclusive dealing coverage to determine whether there is a significant threat to competition, and then at possible efficiency explanations. Id. That test is not materially different from the analysis articulated here.

\(^\text{17}\) Although others have suggested use of a basic Areeda/Turner-like framework for analyzing forms of non-price predation for some time, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 148-60 (1978); Janusz Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981); see also Neumann v. Reinforced Earth Co., 786 F.2d 424, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.), the proposed use of the approach as a test that is nearly universal in evaluating exclusionary conduct is new.

\(^\text{18}\) Werden, supra note 2, at 1; Patterson, supra note 3, at 37-38; see also Melamed, supra note 3, at 1255.
anticompetitive objective is wholly unambiguous because the conduct could not have been undertaken “but for” the prospect of obtaining or maintaining market power.\textsuperscript{19}

Broad application of this narrowly focused test is unwarranted. Although forms of unilateral conduct, particularly pricing and refusals to deal, may warrant consideration under the most narrow and focused antitrust lens, the same is not true for exclusive dealing arrangements.\textsuperscript{20}

The no economic sense test ignores two critical realities. First, the test misses the fact that some harmful practices may be “costless” or require little or no sacrifice in profit.\textsuperscript{21} In the exclusive dealing context, there are many examples in the case law of monopolists using exclusive arrangements that were both nearly costless to the monopolist and, at the same time, marginally more efficient than non-exclusive arrangements. Thus, Microsoft did not have to sacrifice profits by preventing the deletion of Internet Explorer in Windows, or by placing links on the Windows desktop only to those IAPs that agreed to carry Internet Explorer to the exclusion of Netscape. Nor, decades earlier, did United Shoe have to sacrifice profits by requiring its

\textsuperscript{19} Id.

\textsuperscript{20} The no economic sense test or profit sacrifice tests have utility in contexts outside of predatory pricing. Like pricing, courts should be reluctant to interfere with a party’s decision not to share with rivals assets that it has developed or lawfully acquired. In this context, the no economic sense test works well to determine whether consumers will be harmed—protecting the defendant’s incentives to compete and innovate, while condemning refusals to deal where the defendant objectively sacrifices profit in the short-term and, in the long-term, can recoup that loss after its rivals are marginalized. See, e.g., Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985). The Aspen variety of refusal to deal with a horizontal rival—dubbed a “horizontal” refusal to deal by Ken Glazer—should be distinguished from “vertical” refusals to deal, i.e., refusals to deal with a vertically-related supplier or customer that may weaken the competitiveness of the defendant’s rivals. See Kenneth Glazer, Three Key Distinctions Under Section 2, Testimony before the Antitrust Modernization Commission, at 3-5 (Sept. 29, 2005), available at www.amc.gov. Vertical refusals to deal are analyzed in the Section 2 context in the same manner as exclusive dealing.

\textsuperscript{21} Susan A. Creighton, D. Bruce Hoffman, Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Ernest A. Nagata, Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 975, 980-81 (2005); see also Werden, supra note 2, at 15 nn. 48-49.
customers to use only its machinery to the exclusion of its competitors. These practices harmed consumers because the defendant’s market power, in each case, allowed the exclusion of rivals at little or no cost, impairing the constraint on market power the rivals had imposed. Judged by the profit sacrifice or no economic sense test, however, the practices likely would not have been condemned under Section 2.

Second, the no economic sense that ignores the reality that, in many contexts, it is the (limited) exclusion of competition that itself gives rise to efficiencies and associated consumer benefits. Take the typical agreement requiring a distributor to distribute the defendant supplier’s products exclusively. The agreement may enhance the supplier’s sales and lower its costs, making it an effective interbrand competitor. But it has these beneficial effects because (indeed only because) the agreement excludes rivals from the use of the distributor. In a litigation context, the aggrieved rival could easily trot out the no economic sense test and argue that the exclusive deal made economic sense to the defendant only by virtue of its exclusion of rivals. A court applying the test might even agree.

III. EXCLUSIVE DEALING

Exclusive dealing arrangements require a buyer to purchase products or services for a period of time exclusively or predominantly from one supplier. By its nature, exclusive dealing

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24 An exclusive dealing arrangement can violate Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, even if not completely exclusive. United Shoe, 258 U.S. at 455; Applied Medical Resources Corp. v. Ethicon
“forecloses” rival suppliers and/or new entrants from marketing their goods to a particular buyer. This does not, nevertheless, mean that an exclusive is suspect. Every sale excludes rivals to some extent. However, competition is enhanced when rivals are forced to compete for their own sales alternatives; and there are many well-recognized economic benefits that flow from exclusive dealing arrangements that, in a typical case, enhance overall competition in the relevant market. From an antitrust perspective, the concern with exclusive dealing is that rivals will be excluded or marginalized to such an extent that they can no longer constrain the defendant’s market power—resulting in higher prices, lower output, and diminished quality for consumers.

The competition policy concerns with exclusive dealing arrangements are not hypothetical. As discussed below, there are numerous examples in the law of dominant companies using exclusive dealing devices to maintain their monopoly status for extended periods of time. In Pullman, United Shoe, Microsoft, and Dentsply, the dominant company defendants used their market power to force exclusive dealing arrangements upon their customers at no or little cost, and with significant adverse consequences on the market. The costs of exclusion were small; the benefits to the defendants were obvious; and the exclusionary effects of the practice were apparent and enduring. Yet, under most applications of the no economic sense test, none of the arrangements would have been prevented.

Exclusive dealing can violate both Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act and the analysis under both statutes generally proceeds from the same basic approach. Under Section 2, the issue, again, is whether rivals are impaired to such an extent that the defendant can raise

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prices or otherwise harm consumers. The greater the market power of the defendant, the less steep are the demands Section 2 places on an antitrust plaintiff, because even a small increase in a dominant firm’s market power can cause substantial harm to consumers. Conversely, a plaintiff must demonstrate a greater level of impairment to rivals where the party engaged in exclusive dealing enjoys less market power.25

In decades past, under Section 2, courts analyzed non-price related exclusionary conduct simply by inferring competitive harm where a substantial percentage of the market was “foreclosed” to rivals.26 Today, courts engage in a more sophisticated analysis. Rather than simply calculating the percentage of the market “foreclosed,” courts also examine how the exclusionary conduct affects competitive conditions in the relevant market more generally.27 This trend toward a more probing analysis of competitive effects is consistent with more developed economic analyses of antitrust issues generally. The focus of the antitrust inquiry has moved from considering whether the conduct foreclosed competition to whether the foreclosure or other aspect of exclusion was imposed in a way designed to lead to an increase in prices or restriction of output in the market as a whole.28


28 See Jacobson, supra note 8, at 328, and cases cited.
A. Potential Harms of Exclusive Dealing

According to Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp, “[t]he most frequently given rationale for condemning exclusive-dealing arrangements is that they limit the access of upstream rivals to downstream firms, thus reducing upstream competition and creating or perpetuating lower output and higher prices.” 29 Competition can be harmed when upstream rivals have no access to downstream customers, either through the distribution channels blocked by the firm employing the exclusives, or by other means, and where impaired rivals once had operated as important constraints on the defendant’s market power. 30

The level of the distribution chain at which exclusive dealing arrangements operate may be relevant. Exclusive dealing imposed on end users can have more harmful results than exclusive dealing imposed on intermediaries. 31 Although rival suppliers must reach end users, generally they need not reach them through a particular intermediary or even a particular type of intermediary. 32 The relevant question is not, therefore, the percentage of distributors that a manufacturer has locked up, but to the degree to which the exclusive dealing arrangement denies access to the market to competing suppliers of the good or service (and the resulting effect on the

29 11 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 17, ¶ 1802, at 68.
30 Id.; see also Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 4, at 234-36.
31 Omega Envt’l, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 194-95; PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 114 F. Supp. 2d 243, 251-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d, 315 F.3d at 101, 106, 111 (2d Cir. 2002); CDC Techs., Inc. v. Idexx Labs., Inc., 186 F.3d 74, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1999).
32 CDC Techs., Inc., 186 F.3d at 81-82; PepsiCo, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 251-53. In some cases, the distributors may possess some particularly crucial capabilities that make exclusion at the distribution level itself relevant. In Visa, for example, the banks were characterized by the defendants as “mere distributors,” but in fact effectively “manufactured” the card products, with varying features, they provided to consumers. The courts had little difficulty in concluding that exclusion of rival networks from access to the banks was unlawful, even though the rivals (American Express and Discover) could easily reach consumers directly through the mail. See United States v. Visa USA, 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 387-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003).
competitiveness of rivals).\textsuperscript{33} This distribution level foreclosure harms competition not only when it serves to exclude competitors from the market completely, but also where it serves to raise their costs to compete effectively against the company imposing the exclusive dealing arrangements on the market.\textsuperscript{34}

A dominant firm may use exclusive arrangements to raise the costs of fringe firms, providing the dominant firm with an umbrella under which it could raise its own prices. Only where such exclusive arrangements tie up existing sales outlets or more efficient avenues of distribution, resulting in rivals’ costs being raised because the market for their products has been reduced or because they have been forced either to create new avenues of distribution or to use higher-cost distributors, do courts find harm to competition.\textsuperscript{35} Thus, “[r]aising rivals’ costs can be a particularly effective method of anticompetitive exclusion. This strategy need not entail sacrificing one’s own profits in the short run.”\textsuperscript{36}

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\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Gilbarco}, 127 F.3d at 1162-63.


\textsuperscript{35} Krattenmaker & Salop, \textit{supra} note 4, at 224.

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Id.}
B. **Efficiencies Associated with Exclusive Dealing**

Exclusive dealing often makes “economic sense” to both parties to the exclusive deal. Customers, in fact, often seek exclusives for their own benefit. The benefits associated with exclusive dealing are well recognized. As the Supreme Court in *Standard Stations* noted some time ago:

Requirements contracts . . . may well be of an economic advantage to buyers as well as to sellers, and thus indirectly of advantage to the consuming public. In the case of the buyer, they may assure supply, afford protection against rises in price, enable long-term planning on the basis of known costs, and obviate the expense and risk of storage in the quantity necessary for a commodity having a fluctuating demand. From the seller’s point of view, requirements contracts may make possible the substantial reduction of selling expenses, give protection against price fluctuations, and – of a particular advantage to a newcomer to the field to whom it is important to know what capital expenditures are justified – offer the possibility of a predictable market.

Courts properly have considered many significant procompetitive justifications for exclusive arrangements, including the following. Exclusive dealing:

- Induces dealer loyalty: Exclusive dealing encourages dealer or retailer loyalty. If a distributor (or retailer) only carries one brand, that dealer has greater incentive to ensure that the brand succeeds. Likewise, it encourages suppliers to provide dealer-specific investments in training and marketing. And it reduces the likelihood that a distributor will suffer out-of-stocks that would otherwise occur from carrying multiple brands.

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Dampens free-riding: Suppliers have greater incentives to invest in enhancing dealer distribution capabilities when rivals cannot free ride on their efforts.42

Enhances dealer attention to quality assurance: Exclusive dealing ensures a manufacturer that a distributor cannot pass off an inferior product as belonging to the manufacturer, because it carries only the manufacturer’s brand.43

Reduces transaction costs associated with monitoring: When a dealer has only one supplier of its goods in a particular market, the supplier need not worry as much about monitoring the dealer to ensure that its products are well placed, maintained, serviced, or promoted, vis-à-vis competitor products.44

Ensures volume necessary to achieve scale economies. Exclusive arrangements allow suppliers to be confident that they will have sufficient sales volume to justify what may be costly investments in plant and equipment.45

Induces competitive bidding: Firms often seek out competitive bids by providing the incentive of an exclusive to the victor.46

Precisely because exclusive dealing arrangements generally result in some efficiencies and have procompetitive aspects, coupled with the fact that the exclusive dealing often costs very little to impose, application of the no economic sense and profit sacrifice will generate false negatives and false positives. Those errors may be significant because neither test is designed to ask the one question antitrust really cares about—whether consumers are likely to suffer harm. Because neither test considers the overall allocative efficiency or consumer impact of a

42 See Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984); Ryko, 823 F.2d at 1235 n.17.
44 Joyce Beverages, 555 F. Supp. at 275-77.
46 See Steuer, supra note 37.
challenged practice, and instead focuses solely on the internal costs and benefits to the company engaged in the practice, the no economic sense and profit sacrifice tests are indifferent to the protection of overall consumer welfare almost by design.

C. The Economic Sense of Exclusive Dealing Arrangements

Exclusive dealing will often be profitable, and “make economic sense,” even where the associated efficiencies are trivial and the consumer harm significant. And it is equally true that exclusive dealing in many cases will yield efficiencies, and “make economic sense,” only because of the exclusion of competitors, but to the benefit of consumer welfare. Analyzing exclusive dealing only under a no economic sense test will therefore result in many false negatives and false positives.

False negatives. Questions arise about the true economic cost to the defendant of implementing exclusive dealing. Does exclusive dealing qualify as “cheap” exclusion often? Rarely? Never? Some proponents of the no economic sense test suggest that exclusive dealing is often costly, requiring direct or indirect compensation to the affected dealers or significant internal costs in articulating, implementing, and monitoring the restraints. When the no economic sense test takes these costs into account, it is said, the arrangement will not escape prohibition and the test will not, as argued here, fail to prevent arrangements that are genuinely harmful.47

It is quite correct that exclusive dealing may involve significant costs to the defendant. In fact, the original Chicago School argument for allowing all, or almost all, exclusive dealing was that the defendant would have to reduce its price or offer equivalent value to the customer that

47 See Melamed, supra note 3, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. at __ (manuscript at 40-43).
equaled, one-for-one, the value of exclusivity such that any welfare losses would be completely offset by welfare gains.\textsuperscript{48} But post-Chicago writers long ago debunked that analysis, and it is now common ground that, in many contexts, exclusive dealing can be deployed in a way that is both profitable for the dealer (or other customer) and that allows the defendant to reap gains from the arrangement that far exceed the associated costs.\textsuperscript{49}

The greater the monopolist’s power, the greater the potential harm of an effective exclusive dealing scheme. Where defendants already have market or monopoly power, the cost associated with implementing an exclusive dealing scheme designed to diminish consumer welfare can be quite small because a dominant firm may be able to make an all or nothing offer that leaves its customers with no real choice but to comply. As a result, a test that focuses only on the internal costs of exclusive dealing to the defendant will tend to underestimate the harm that the practice can impose upon consumers in a relevant market.

More generally, exclusive dealing often can be profitable to the defendant and its distributors while, at the same time, serving to exclude rivals whose presence would enable downstream price competition. For example, if a monopoly seller ties up key distributors with significant discounts, the seller can offer progressively lower discounts to the later-coming distributors. Although the early distributors may be motivated to sign the exclusives by reason of the discount, creating some net economic benefit for themselves, the effect may be to raise substantial barriers to entry for competing sellers, as all of the most effective distributors will have been signed up by the firm employing the exclusive scheme. After entry is thwarted, the

\textsuperscript{48} See BORK, supra note 17, at 299-309.

later distributors can be compelled to pay a price at or near the monopoly level, and those higher prices will be passed on to consumers. The arrangement could well be argued to make “economic sense,” with seller efficiencies achieved through the exclusives, notwithstanding significant harm to the welfare of consumers. Depending on the sophistication of the antitrust decision-maker, application of the no economic sense test in this type of case therefore may fail to identify the most exclusionary arrangements. And even the most careful analyst will have great difficulty in determining the outcome: Does the arrangement make economic sense because of the efficiencies it is generating or “only” because of the exclusionary impact on rivals? The efficiencies and exclusionary effects are often the same.

*False positives.* Conversely, focusing on the profitability to the defendant also runs the risk of mistaking costly competition for exclusion and thereby condemning exclusive arrangements that result in lower prices and greater output for consumers. The facts of *Louisa Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Metro Bottling Co.* illustrate the point. There, a Coca-Cola bottler challenged the locally-dominant Pepsi bottler’s marketing agreements with area retailers. The marketing agreements provide the Pepsi bottler with additional shelf space and exclusive promotional activities in return for marketing funds and discounts. The plaintiff had the opportunity to compete for the incremental space and promotional activity, but declined to do so. The court applied the rule of reason and dismissed the Coke bottler’s case because the limited promotional exclusivity had no adverse effect on competition.

The marketing funds and discounts in *Louisa* were quite costly to the Pepsi bottler. They made “economic sense” if, and only if, the promotional activity was exclusive. If the retailers

50 See Segal & Whinston, *supra* note 49.

could promote the Coke bottler’s products at the same time, consumers walking into the store would see a Coke display rather than a Pepsi display and purchase Coke products rather than Pepsi; the Pepsi bottler would not receive the same level of sales benefit, and its incentives to provide the discounts would have been diminished. The discounts thus made economic sense to the Pepsi bottler only because of their effect in limiting competition from rivals. But, as the court concluded, they were beneficial to consumers and not harmful to competition. If the “no economic sense” test had been applied, however, the court easily might have reached the opposite result—condemning the Pepsi bottler’s competitive activities on the basis that they made economic sense only because of their effect in excluding competition from rivals.  

IV. MAJOR CASES

Prominent exclusive dealing cases demonstrate the concern with importing the no economic sense test from its predatory pricing origins to non-pricing Section 2 cases. In each of Microsoft, United Shoe, and most recently, Dentsply, it appears clear that the monopolists challenged with violations of Section 2 engaged in conduct that cost little, created marginal efficiencies greater than cost, and yet managed to harm consumer welfare. If each of these cases had been viewed from the lens of the no economic sense test, it appears far less likely that the conduct in each would have been judged illegal under Section 2, even though the harm to consumer welfare in each case was evident. Conversely, application of the no economic sense sense

52 A result of just that type was in fact reached in Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 111 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. App. 2003), petition for review granted. (Tex. 2004) (argued November 9, 2004). The appeals court upheld the judgment holding Coca-Cola’s marketing practices illegal in large part because their efficacy depended on the agreements’ ability to “restrict what retailers can do with regard to the competitors’ products.” Id. at 304-06. (As a disclaimer, Mr. Jacobson argued the Texas Supreme Court appeal in Harmar on behalf of Coca-Cola.)

53 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 76-77; United Shoe, 258 U.S. at 456; Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 192-93.
could result in condemnation of exclusive arrangements that are utterly benign. The *Joyce Beverages* case provides a useful example.\(^{54}\)

A brief discussion of each of these cases follows.

### A. Microsoft

In *Microsoft*, the plaintiffs alleged that, by closing to rivals a substantial percentage of the available opportunities for browser distribution, Microsoft managed to preserve its monopoly in the market for operating systems (OS).\(^{55}\) According to the D.C. Circuit, “[b]y ensuring that the majority of all [Internet Access Provider (IAP)] subscribers are offered IE either as the default browser or as the only browser, Microsoft’s deals with the IAPs clearly have a significant effect in preserving its monopoly; they help keep usage of Navigator below the critical level necessary for Navigator or any other rival to pose a real threat to Microsoft’s monopoly.”\(^{56}\)

Microsoft had a monopoly in the OS market. Netscape’s Navigator, at the time, was thought to pose a risk to the Microsoft OS monopoly. To preserve its position in the market, Microsoft engaged in a number of allegedly anticompetitive practices. Specifically, the D.C. Circuit concluded that several exclusive dealing tactics blocked Navigator from a substantial portion of the end-user market, denying customers the choice of Navigator as an alternative to the Microsoft Internet browser. Among Microsoft’s tactics were (1) an agreement with various OEMs requiring it to place Microsoft’s IE on the desktop, to the exclusion of other browsers; (2) developing the IE access kit, which permitted IAPs to create a distinctive identity for their service, but only if it employed IE; (3) other agreements with IAPs that provided additional


\(^{55}\) *Microsoft*, 253 F.3d at 70.

\(^{56}\) *Id.* at 71.
support and access in exchange for their favoring of IE over Netscape;⁵⁷ (4) omitting IE from the Add/Remove applet in Control Panel; and (5) placing IAPs in a folder on the Windows desktop if, but only if, the IAP used IE, rather than Netscape, as its browser. Each of these tactics “required the other party to promote and distribute Internet Explorer to the partial or complete exclusion of Navigator. In exchange, Microsoft offered, to some or all of these parties, promotional patronage, substantial financial subsidies, technical support, and other valuable consideration.”⁵⁸

These efforts by Microsoft to protect its Windows monopoly cost little, at least in comparison with the additional distribution it gained through the OEMs and IAPs. The extraordinary power of the OS monopoly made it difficult for these third parties to say no to the terms Microsoft offered. Yet Microsoft’s exclusive dealing tactics (one of many strategies, to be sure) were arguably successful—Netscape was marginalized, and ultimately was unable to compete effectively in the market. Yet, under a strict application of the no economic sense and profit sacrifice tests, most would conclude that Microsoft’s conduct was not illegal—there was no “sacrifice” of profitability since the restrictive clauses were both profitable and exclusionary at the same time. As Professor Gavil explained:

[I]n the Microsoft case, Microsoft did not appear to sacrifice any profits when it imposed various exclusionary licensing and contractual restrictions on its various classes of customers, or when it integrated its various programs into its operating system. . . . In fact, these acts were facilitated by its market power. Ironically, it is that very market power which, especially in extreme cases, can permit a dominant firm to exclude at no or little cost.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Id. at 70-71.
⁵⁹ Gavil, supra note 5, at 56-57.
Defenders of the no economic sense deny that the test would give Microsoft a pass. They say that there was a “cost” to Microsoft in that it had to explain to OEMs what it was doing. Even if this were true, it ignores some tactics that were truly costless, such as preventing the deletion of IE or including in the desktop online services folders only those IAPs that agreed to use IE exclusively. But much more importantly, the entire debate highlights the fundamental problem with the no economic test. Liability should not turn on whether it was very costly, somewhat costly, or entirely costless for Microsoft to argue with OEMs. Liability should turn on whether consumers were, or likely would be, harmed.

B. United Shoe

United Shoe was a notorious monopoly for decades and, indeed, its practices were cited prominently in the debates that led to the passage of Section 3 of the Clayton Act. The company controlled a substantial portion of the market for providing shoe-making machinery to shoe manufacturers in the United States. The government sued, alleging that United Shoe violated the Sherman Act through illegal exclusive dealing arrangements. One provision of the challenged lease agreements required exclusive use of United Shoe’s machines; once a lessee used the machine of one of United Shoe’s competitors, United Shoe had the right to cancel the lease, at any time. Although the lease provisions did not require exclusive usage—specifically,

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60 See H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914); S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
62 Id. at 456.
they did “not contain specific agreements not to use the machinery of a competitor of the lessor, the practical effect of these drastic provisions [wa]s to prevent such use.”

Although the exclusive provisions were of short duration, the harms associated with such provisions were significant. The quasi-exclusive nature of the contract created a substantial burden on lessees. If the lessee decided to use the equipment of a competitor to United Shoe, United Shoe could cancel its lease, imposing upon the lessee the substantial burden of having to purchase additional equipment for competitor manufacturers, which would be both expensive and time-consuming.

Because of its dominant position in the market, United Shoe was able to impose this de facto exclusive term on its lessees without reducing its lease prices significantly. Lessees trapped by the high cost of switching out United Shoe’s equipment for that of a competitor were not in a position to negotiate better terms in exchange for exclusivity. The tactic made perfect economic sense for United Shoe—it did not entail a short-term sacrifice of profits as the quasi-exclusive nature of the contracts imposed no additional cost upon the company, and at the same time served to exclude rivals from the market by foreclosing their distribution opportunities. Yet under the no economic sense and profit sacrifice tests, United Shoe’s conduct—which allowed it to maintain a substantial monopoly over many decades—likely would not be found to violate Section 2.

63 Id. at 457.
64 Id. at 457-58.
65 Id.
C. Dentsply

Dentsply was the leading manufacturer of prefabricated artificial teeth, accounting for 75–80 percent of sales. The company sold its artificial teeth through independent dental dealers (i.e., distributors). The dealers in turn distributed the teeth to dental laboratories for use in the creation of dentures. Notwithstanding the absence of written contracts requiring dealers to purchase Dentsply teeth exclusively, Dentsply prohibited its dealers from carrying the teeth of competitors. Dentsply’s dealers were at liberty, however, to end their relationship with Dentsply at any time, for any reason, and without penalty. In the more than ten years that Dentsply had maintained the exclusive dealing criteria prior to the DOJ challenge, no dealer dropped the Dentsply product line in favor of competing brands of artificial teeth.

The Department of Justice contended that Dentsply’s dealer program amounted to illegal exclusive dealing under the no economic sense test. The district court, however, found for the defendant, concluding that Dentsply’s arrangements did not foreclose a sufficient portion of the market from competitors and that Dentsply’s competition had the opportunity to sell artificial teeth direct, or could instead attempt to “flip” Dentsply’s distributors by offering higher quality teeth or better prices.

66 United States v. Dentsply Int’l, 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, No. 05-337 (Jan. 9, 2006).
67 Id. at 185.
68 Id. at 193-94.
69 The district court also concluded that there was no efficiency explanation for Dentsply’s exclusive arrangements. United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d 387, 419 (D. Del. 2003), rev’d, 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, No. 05-337 (Jan. 9, 2006). See note 73 below.
The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that Dentsply’s exclusive arrangements harmed competition by limiting consumer choice and slowing the decline of prices of artificial teeth.\textsuperscript{70} According to the Third Circuit, because rivals could not access the market through the relatively more efficient distributors that were locked-up by Dentsply, their costs to compete effectively were substantially higher, making them less competitive in the market. Dentsply’s use of exclusive dealing, in effect, served as a defensive mechanism to maintain its monopoly in the market.\textsuperscript{71}

Although the Third Circuit did not expressly engage in a balancing of procompetitive justifications of the exclusive dealing arrangements versus their competitive harm, the court implicitly recognized that there was some efficiency justification for such an arrangement, saying: “Dealers also provide benefits to manufacturers . . . . [D]ealers provide manufacturers more marketplace exposure and sales representative coverage than manufacturers are able to generate on their own. Increased exposure and sales coverage traditionally lead to greater sales.”\textsuperscript{72}

Notwithstanding the Justice Department’s arguments, Dentsply’s conduct easily could have been shielded under the “no economic sense” or “profit sacrifice” tests from Section 2 liability because—under the circuit court’s analysis—adding more dealers would provide some economic benefits to Dentsply at little cost. The use of exclusive dealers provides dealer focus and prevents free riding, and does not cost much to achieve. Had the no economic sense test been employed, Dentsply’s arrangements—which allowed it to maintain higher prices and

\textsuperscript{70} Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 194-96.

\textsuperscript{71} Id.

\textsuperscript{72} Id. at 192-93.
impeded competitive entry and expansion—could have been upheld. The court of appeals, applying a broader rule of reason analysis, correctly held otherwise.73

**D. Joyce Beverages**

Royal Crown distributed its cola products in New York through Joyce Beverages, a bottler whose product line also included 7-Up. RC’s agreement with Joyce, and with each of its other bottlers, provided that the bottler would distribute no other brands of cola. 7-Up’s owners, however, came up with a new cola product, “Like,” and sought to distribute it in New York through Joyce. Joyce thought this was just fine—after all it was adding a new product—but RC cried foul and enforced the exclusivity clause in its agreement, saying that Joyce would be terminated if it took on “Like.” Joyce sued, but the district court had no trouble in denying relief and upholding the exclusive dealing arrangement. The court recognized that exclusivity eliminated conflicting incentives, and motivated Joyce to ensure that RC was a more effective competitor.74

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73 Proponents of the no economic sense test often cite *Dentsply* as an exclusive dealing case where the defendant’s conduct—signing up all the major artificial teeth distributors—made no economic sense. Werden, *supra* note 2, at 4. Indeed, the district court found “that the sole purpose of the policy was to exclude Dentsply’s competitors from the dealers.” 277 F. Supp. 2d at 419. And, on appeal, the Justice Department argued that the defendant’s conduct was unlawful under the no economic sense test. Brief for the United States, United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., No. 03-4097, 2004 WL 255652, at 13 (3d Cir. Jan. 16, 2004). If the district court’s find was correct, then *Dentsply* was a truly exceptional case. Although some exclusive dealing arrangements may make no economic sense, and may be employed solely in order to exclude competitors, the number of instances where the arrangements will not have some net positive effect on the defendant’s distribution capabilities will be quite small. In *Dentsply*, there is reason to suspect that the district court’s finding may have been erroneous, as suggested by the text of the circuit court’s opinion, 399 F.3d at 192-93, quoted above. Adding additional distributors generally enhances the supplier’s distribution capabilities, and doing so exclusively likely created for Dentsply some marginal measure of efficiency by reducing monitoring costs, ensuring a source of supply for the artificial teeth distributors, and diminishing the company’s transaction costs. The point here is that simply looking to whether the scheme made economic sense to the defendant creates a high risk of missing the effect of the practice on consumer welfare.

74 555 F. Supp. at 276-77.
What if the court had been asked to invoke the no economic sense test? Joyce could have argued, with some force, that exclusivity made sense for RC only because of its effect in eliminating competition for Joyce’s business by rival cola suppliers. RC, of course, would have advanced contrary arguments. But the no economic sense argument by the plaintiff in this instance would have had at least a superficial appeal, and could, if accepted, have resulted in an alarming false positive.

V. THE RULE OF REASON

No radical reformation of Section 2 jurisprudence is required for exclusive dealing arrangements. The appropriate test is the basic rule of reason—an examination of the exclusive dealing arrangement’s effect on consumer welfare. It is the same test used to examine other vertical and horizontal restraints, and essentially the test employed in analyzing mergers.\(^{75}\)

A first step in every case is for the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of competitive harm. A prima facie case will typically have three components. (a) To begin with, there must be proof of market power (or a probability that market power will be acquired) in a relevant market. As the D.C. Circuit explained in \textit{Microsoft}, when “an exclusive deal is challenged, it is clear that in all cases the plaintiff must” demonstrate that a defendant has market power in a relevant market.\(^{76}\) Without market power, and the ability to harm consumer welfare, conduct cannot violate Section 2.\(^{77}\) (b) The plaintiff must show that the exclusive dealing impairs rivals and, as a


\(^{76}\) \textit{Microsoft}, 253 F.3d at 69; \textit{see also} Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Communications, 2006 WL 45859, at *7-8 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sherman Act § 2); United States v. Visa USA, 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003) (Sherman Act § 1), \textit{cert. denied}, 125 S. Ct. 45 (2004).

result, lessens the constraints on the defendant’s market power. The relevant inquiry in this respect is whether, as a result of the impairment, the defendant has an enhanced ability to raise prices or limit choice or quality.\(^{78}\) As recent cases hold, proof of “foreclosure” alone is not enough.\(^{79}\) (c) The plaintiff must also show that the exclusivity itself is not the product of the competitive process. Where a customer puts its business up for bid to secure a lower price, “competition for the contract” necessarily results.\(^{80}\) If that is all there is, there is no showing of consumer harm. Where, however, there has been an impairment of rivals sufficient to harm consumers that is not a necessary outcome of the competitive process, a prima facie case has been established.

Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden of going forward shifts to the defense to provide business for the challenged practice. The types of efficiencies that are cognizable in this context are those that offer the prospect of lower prices, greater output, and other benefits to consumers. The types of efficiencies summarized above are illustrative.

Once the defendant has met its burden of production, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to provide evidence in rebuttal. That evidence may include proof that the claimed efficiencies do not exist; are pretextual; or that the same or similar benefits could easily be achieved by significantly less restrictive means.

\(^{78}\) Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 4, at 236-38.

\(^{79}\) Gilbarco, 127 F.3d at 1162-63.

\(^{80}\) Paddock Pubs. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 45 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Louisa Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Metro Bottling Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 804 (E.D. Ky. 1999). With respect to this inquiry, the no economic sense may have some relevance. It may be difficult, in some cases, to distinguish exclusivity that impairs competition from exclusivity that is the product of competition. One way, of course, is to assess the customer’s reaction. See Richard M. Steuer, Customer Instigated Exclusive Dealing, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 239 (2000). When customer views are ambiguous, however, application of the no economic sense test may be useful as one input into the analysis. See Jacobson, supra note 8, at 350.
Most cases will have been resolved by this point. The plaintiff may fail to present a prima facie case. The defendant may not be able to demonstrate cognizable, non-pretextual efficiencies. Or the plaintiff will be unable to demonstrate that the same efficiencies could have been achieved in a much less restrictive way. However, truly rare cases arise in which the final step—an assessment of magnitudes and corresponding balancing—becomes necessary. In those rare instances, the question will be whether the net effect or competition is substantially adverse. Only where the net effect, taking efficiencies into account, is to create a likelihood of increased prices, lower output, or reduced quality, should exclusive dealing be found unlawful. Because exclusive dealing offers substantial benefits—including decreased cost of distribution, elimination of free-riding, enhanced interbrand competition, and secure source of supply—it will be a relatively rare case when an exclusive arrangement will violation Section 1 or Section 2. But when that case is found, condemnation should follow.

The analysis articulated here is not unusual, or new, or different. It is the same analysis courts have applied for years in rule of reason cases under both Section 1 and Section 2. It is fundamentally the same test that the courts and agencies apply almost every day in determining

81 See Jacobson, supra note 8, at 365-69.

Establishing a violation of the rule of reason involves three steps. “Plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the challenged action has had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market. . . .” If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the “pro-competitive ‘redeeming virtues’” of the action. Should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then show that the same pro-competitive effect could be achieved through an alternative means that is less restrictive of competition.
whether a merger violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act, a process that necessarily involves a
determination whether the net effect of the transaction is to raise prices or not.83

Proponents of the no economic sense test criticize the rule of reason as too complicated.
In fact, given the difficulties encountered in applying the no economic sense test to exclusive
dealing, a fair response would be that application of traditional rule of reason analysis is a good
deal less complicated.84 But even if that were not the case, the complexity objection is meritless.
The objective of antitrust policy is to protect consumers, and the analysis necessary to achieve
that result may, in unusual cases, be difficult. The associated cost, if there is any, is well worth
bearing. Perceived complexity was the basis for the huge expansion of per se analysis from the
1940s through the early 1970s.85 In hindsight, we can safely characterize that approach as
misguided.86 Ousting the rule of reason was erroneous then. It is no less a mistake in the
exclusive dealing context now.


84 The no economic sense test requires essentially the same balancing in determining profitability of the practice to the defendant that its proponents attack as too complicated when applied in determining the impact on consumers under the rule of reason. See note 9 above. The degree of complexity in applying the rule of reason can easily be overstated, for the rule of reason can often—perhaps usually—be applied “in the twinkling of an eye.” 7 P. AREEDA, \textsc{Antitrust Law} ¶ 1508a (1986); \textit{see also} NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109-10 n.39 (1984) (quoting Areeda). For some of the complexities in applying the no economic sense test, see Steven C. Salop, \textit{Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard}, 73 \textsc{Antitrust L.J.} ___ (forthcoming 2006).


86 \textit{E.g.}, State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1977).