I OVERVIEW OF RECENT PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION ACTIVITY

Nearly every year over the past decade, the US Supreme Court has significantly changed the private antitrust litigation landscape. Starting with the establishment of a heightened ‘plausibility’ pleading standard that governs whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, subsequent decisions have clarified that:

a. conduct must be directly linked to cognisable harm or injury to give rise to an antitrust claim;

b. activities inextricably intertwined with US Securities and Exchange Commission regulatory activity are immune from antitrust attack;

c. plaintiffs bringing antitrust actions under state law in federal court may pursue class actions or class-action remedies not otherwise available in state court;

d. a federal court’s denial of class-certification for a proposed class does not preclude a state court from later adjudicating another plaintiff’s proposed class;

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arbitrators may not impose class arbitration on parties unless it is contractually permissible;\(^7\)

express arbitration clauses trump class-action rights, even in antitrust cases;\(^8\)

expert testimony does not overcome lack of commonality in class actions;\(^9\)

class certification requires that plaintiffs establish that damages can be proven with class-wide evidence to satisfy FRCP 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement;\(^10\)

individual corporate entities that are part of a joint venture may be subject to antitrust ‘rule-of-reason’ scrutiny;\(^11\)

an order disposing of one discrete case consolidated in an MDL under 28 USC Section 1407 is an appealable final decision under 28 USC Section 1291;\(^12\) and

that stare decisis may have less than ‘usual force in cases involving the Sherman Act’.\(^13\)

The lower federal courts apply these Supreme Court cases, deciding issues related to antitrust injury, standing requirements, the statute of limitations, class actions, discovery and pleading standards.

II GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

Private plaintiffs may bring suit in federal court for violations of federal antitrust law under two provisions of the Clayton Act of 1914. Section 4 allows private plaintiffs to sue for money damages, including reasonable attorneys’ fees as well as prejudgment interest on actual damages at a court’s discretion if such an award is ‘just’ under the circumstances.\(^14\) Section 16 allows private plaintiffs to sue for injunctive relief.\(^15\)

Statute-of-limitations limit the period of potential recovery

A four-year statute-of-limitations applies to Section 4 claims.\(^16\) The limitations period commences when the cause of action accrues, which generally occurs when the plaintiff suffers injury and damages become ascertainable.\(^17\) Section 16 claims may also be subject to a four-year statute of limitations. Some courts have held that the four-year limitation period

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\(^8\) AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
\(^15\) Id. Section 26.
\(^16\) Id. Section 15(b).
also applies to Section 16 claims, while others have held that it does not. The defence of laches nevertheless bars Section 16 claims four years after accrual of the cause of action, unless the court finds equitable reasons to allow the claim. The statute of limitations may be tolled by government antitrust actions, the filing of a class action, fraudulent concealment, duress, or equitable estoppel. Where a series of overt acts rather than one definitive act causes new injury to plaintiffs, the ‘continuing violation’ doctrine restarts the statute of limitations period. Some courts allow the tacking of tolling periods.

ii State antitrust claims

Most US states and territories have adopted antitrust statutes. They generally mirror the federal scheme and prohibit monopolies and unreasonable agreements (like the Sherman and Clayton Acts) and unfair and deceptive trade practices (like the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act). The vast majority provide for private rights of action. Statute of limitations periods vary by state. The statutes and courts’ interpretations of them differ on various points, such as the availability of treble damages, restitution, class actions, and availability of recovery for indirect purchasers.

III EXTRATERRITORIALITY

i General jurisdictional rule

The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA) limits the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act to foreign anticompetitive conduct that either involves US import commerce or has a ‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’ on US import or

18 E.g., Weinberger v. Retail Credit Co., 498 F.2d 552, 556 (4th Cir. 1974).
20 15 U.S.C. Section 16(i).
22 E.g., In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litigation, 527 F.3d 517, 536–38 (6th Cir. 2008); In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation, 305 F.3d 145, 160 (3d Cir. 2002).
26 E.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 460–61 (2d Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by Goldberger v. Integrated Resources Inc., 209 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000).
domestic commerce. Courts have construed this to require a ‘reasonably proximate causal nexus’ between the conduct and the effect of US commerce or import commerce, a standard similar to a proximate causation standard. Additionally, a plaintiff’s injury must occur in the US rather than a foreign market to ‘give rise to’ a claim under the Sherman Act. Although the US effects requirement is sometimes characterised as a jurisdictional issue, it has been treated as a substantive element of the Sherman Act.

When a plaintiff alleges other antitrust claims, such as under the Clayton Act, the extraterritoriality test applies, subject to territorial limitations found in the substantive provision asserted. For example, Section 3 of the Clayton Act only reaches transactions in which the products are sold for use, consumption or resale in the US. Additionally, the FTAIA extends the Sherman Act’s extraterritoriality test to apply to the FTC Act.

A circuit split has arisen as to whether the FTAIA bars Sherman Act claims arising out of foreign conduct of a cartel. While the Seventh Circuit interpreted the FTAIA as barring the Sherman Act claims, the Ninth Circuit held that the conduct of the same cartel was within the reach of the Sherman Act. The US Supreme Court recently denied a petition for certiorari to resolve this issue so lower courts will continue to develop the law to clarify how these decisions apply.

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28 15 U.S.C. Section 6a. Where conduct involves import trade or commerce, the FTAIA does not apply and courts instead apply the common law ‘intended effects’ test, requiring that the foreign anticompetitive conduct was intended to and actually affected US trade or commerce. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443–44 (2d Cir. 1945). Some courts supplement the effects test with considerations of comity. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association, 549 F.2d 597, 611–15 (9th Cir. 1976).

29 Lotes Co., Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., 753 F.3d 395, 398 (2d Cir. 2014); Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc); Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc); In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM), 546 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008); In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litigation, 477 F.3d 535 (8th Cir. 2007); Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd, 417 F.3d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2005).


34 Id. Section 45(a)(3).

35 Motorola Mobility v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2014).

36 United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2015).
ii  Comity considerations

A court may employ comity considerations to decline jurisdiction, even when the FTAIA's requirements have been satisfied. Comity considerations generally come into play when domestic and foreign law are in conflict, such as where one law requires a defendant to engage in acts prohibited by other laws. The existence of conflicting legal obligations is just one of several factors a court will weigh when considering declining jurisdiction.

iii  Exemptions

Foreign sovereigns are presumptively immune from US courts' jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). To rebut the presumption, a plaintiff must show that one of the FSIA's seven exceptions applies. The most common exemption in antitrust cases is the commercial activity exception, which precludes FSIA immunity where a foreign sovereign state's commercial activity has a 'nexus' with the US. The scope of 'commercial' activity, 'foreign state', and the specific nexus required to meet this exception has been extensively litigated.

The act-of-state doctrine requires US courts to recognise the validity of public acts performed by authorised agents of foreign sovereign states within their jurisdictions. Thus, where a plaintiff's claim depends on the invalidity of a foreign sovereign state's domestic act, the act-of-state doctrine may absolve the defendant of liability. Various exceptions apply, such as where an extant treaty provides applicable legal standards, where the act involves a commercial function, or where US foreign policy interests would not be advanced by application of the doctrine.

A private party whose conduct was compelled (and not merely sanctioned or assisted) by a foreign sovereign state will generally be immune from antitrust liability under the assumption that the defendant's activity was effectively foreign sovereign state activity. US courts are generally bound to defer to a foreign government's interpretation of its own laws.

40 28 U.S.C. Section 1604.
41 Id. Section 1605.
42 The commercial activity exception, Section 1605(a)(2), states that immunity does not apply when 'the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States'.
46 E.g., Animal Sci. Prods., 837 F.3d at 189.
IV STANDING

i Standing under Section 4 of the Clayton Act

To maintain a lawsuit under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, an antitrust plaintiff must allege:

a the plaintiff is a ‘person’ under Section 1 of the Clayton Act; 47
b the defendant violated the ‘antitrust laws’; 48

c antitrust injury (‘impact’ or ‘fact of damage’), 49 that is, harm to competition 50 to plaintiff’s ‘business or property’ proven by direct or circumstantial evidence or inference 51 with a reasonable degree of certainty; 52 and
d the antitrust violation was a material and substantial cause of the injury. 53

Finally, plaintiff must satisfy the remoteness doctrine, which requires a plaintiff’s injury to not be too remote from defendant’s conduct, via a five-factored inquiry:

a causal connection between the violation and the harm to the plaintiff, and whether defendants intended to cause the harm;
b nature of the injury, including whether the plaintiff is a consumer or competitor;
c directness of the injury, and how speculative or tenuous the damages are;
d potential for duplication of recovery or complex apportionment of damages; and
e whether more direct victims exist.

The doctrine generally limits the plaintiff class to consumers and competitors, and denies standing to creditors, employees, officers, shareholders and suppliers of antitrust victims. The

47 15 U.S.C. Section 15. Section 12(a) defines ‘persons’ as ‘corporations and associations existing under or authorized by laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country.’ Courts have also interpreted ‘persons’ to include individual consumers (e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corporation, 442 U.S. 330, 340–42 (1979)), partnerships (e.g., Coast v. Hunt Oil Co., 195 F.2d 870, 871 (5th Cir. 1952)), states (e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Arizona, 738 F.2d 1021, 1023 (9th Cir. 1984)), and foreign governments (Pfizer v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 318–20 (1978)). Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Section 15(b)) generally limits recovery by foreign governments to actual, instead of treble, damages. While the United States and state attorneys general are not considered ‘persons’ under the Clayton Act, they are nonetheless entitled to sue on their own behalf under Sections 4A and 4C of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sections 15a, 15c).

48 E.g., 15 U.S.C. Sections 12(a) and 15.


50 E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977); see, e.g., Southeast Missouri Hospital v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 616 F.3d 888 (3d Cir. 2010); Race Tires America v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 2010); But see Palmyra Park Hospital v. Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital, 604 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2010).


52 Duty Free Americas, Inc. v. Estee Lauder Companies, 797 F.3d 1248, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2015); Mostly Media v. US W Communications, 186 F.3d 864, 865–66 (8th Cir. 1999); OK Sand & Gravel v. Martin Marietta Technologies, 36 F.3d 565, 573 (7th Cir. 1994).

53 E.g., Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006).
remoteness doctrine may bar an indirect purchaser from bringing a Section 4 claim unless it is a competitor. Some courts require that the plaintiff is an ‘efficient enforcer’ or a potential competitor sufficiently prepared to enter the market.

ii Standing under Section 16 of the Clayton Act

A plaintiff who has standing to bring an antitrust action under Section 4 will also have standing under the more lenient requirements of Section 16, which are as follows:\footnote{15 U.S.C. Section 26.}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a] the plaintiff is a ‘person, firm, corporation, or association’;\footnote{Id.}
  \item[b] the defendant violated the ‘antitrust laws’;\footnote{395 U.S. at 130; but see Freedom Holdings v. Cuomo, 624 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Freedom Holdings v. Schneider, 31 S. Ct. 1810 (2011).}
  \item[c] the threatened loss or damage proximately results from the alleged antitrust violation;\footnote{1675 U.S.C. Section 26.} and
  \item[d] the ‘antitrust injury’, that is threatened loss or injury, is due to harm to competition.\footnote{Cargill Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 112–13 (1986); Zenith, 395 U.S. at 130.}
\end{itemize}

But there are differences. Section 16 requires ‘threatened loss or damage’\footnote{15 U.S.C. Section 15.} that is a ‘significant threat of injury from an impending violation of the antitrust laws or from a contemporary violation likely to continue or recur’\footnote{Cargill, 479 U.S. at 111.} rather than actual loss.\footnote{Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 735.} Unlike Section 4 claims, the threatened loss or injury in a Section 16 claim is not limited to injury to business or property.\footnote{E.g., In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, 221 F.R.D. 260, 273–74 (D. Mass. 12 May 2004).} Finally, courts do not impose the remoteness doctrine on Section 16 claims so indirect purchasers may sue for injunctive relief, even though they may not sue for monetary damages.\footnote{Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machine Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968); Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 736.}

iii Indirect purchaser standing

Generally, indirect purchasers who purchase from a defendant but indirectly through a downstream distributor cannot recover under federal antitrust laws unless:\footnote{Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 735 (1977).}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a] the direct purchaser had a pre-existing ‘cost-plus’ contract with an overcharge, shifting the entire overcharge to the indirect purchaser;\footnote{Sanger Insurance Agency v. Hub International Ltd, 802 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 2015); Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 711 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2013).}
\end{itemize}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item[54] Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1169 (8th Cir. 1998).
\item[56] Sanger Insurance Agency v. Hub International Ltd, 802 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 2015); Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 711 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2013).
\item[57] Palmyra Park Hospital v. Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital, 604 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2010).
\item[59] Id.
\item[61] Cargill Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 112–13 (1986); Zenith, 395 U.S. at 130.
\item[63] 395 U.S. at 130; but see Freedom Holdings v. Cuomo, 624 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Freedom Holdings v. Schneider, 31 S. Ct. 1810 (2011).
\item[64] 15 U.S.C. Section 15.
\item[65] Cargill, 479 U.S. at 111.
\item[67] Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 735.
\item[68] Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machine Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968); Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 736.
\end{itemize}
b the ownership-control exception where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by
the defendant or the indirect purchaser;\textsuperscript{69} or
c the direct purchaser was a co-conspirator.\textsuperscript{70}

Indirect purchasers may recover under the \textit{Illinois Brick} repealer statutes of 26 states as well
as state consumer protection statutes.\textsuperscript{71}

\section{V THE PROCESS OF DISCOVERY}

The scope of discovery in antitrust cases is broad and expansive. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) 26 allows discovery of a reasonable time, geographical and subject matter
if requested information is relevant to any claim or defence, is proportional to the needs of
the case, and outweighs the burden imposed on the responding party. What is relevant for
discovery is broader than what is admissible as evidence at trial.

Courts may restrict ‘unduly burdensome’ discovery requests where the burden and
expense outweigh the prospective benefit of the requests.\textsuperscript{72} FRCP 26(c) allows courts to restrict
discovery of confidential business information or trade secrets and privileged attorney–client
communications or attorney work product. Grand jury materials are only discoverable if the
party has strongly demonstrated a ‘particularized need’ for the materials.\textsuperscript{73}

In deciding whether to allow discovery from non-party market participants, courts
consider the relevance of and need for the information, whether the information is protected
as trade secrets or confidential commercial information, and whether the request will cause
the non-party undue hardship.\textsuperscript{74} A party that refuses to comply with a court order may face
sanctions.\textsuperscript{75}

Courts generally grant requests to compel discovery from domestic or foreign affiliates
or subsidiaries of corporations that are parties to the antitrust case.\textsuperscript{76} Generally, a foreign party
subject to personal jurisdiction in the US is subject to discovery.\textsuperscript{77} Foreign blocking statutes
do not excuse a corporation present in the US to resist producing documents located abroad.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Illinois Brick}, 431 U.S. at 736 n.16.

\textsuperscript{70} E.g., \textit{Insulate SB, Inc. v. Advanced Finishing Systems}, 797 F.3d 538, 542 (11th Cir. 2015);
\textit{Paper Systems v. Nippon Paper Industries Co.}, 281 F.3d 629, 631 (7th Cir. 2002); Campos \textit{v. Ticketmaster Corp.}, 140 F.3d 1166, 1171, n.4 (8th Cir. 1998); Arizona \textit{v. Shamrock Foods},
729 F.3d 1208, 1212–14 (9th Cir. 1984).


\textsuperscript{72} FRCP 26(b)(1); e.g., \textit{In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litigation}, No. C 04-02676 CRB, 2007-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) Paragraph 75, 760 (N.D. Cal. 25 June 2007).


\textsuperscript{74} E.g., \textit{ACT Inc. v. Sylvan Learning Sys}, No. CIV A 99-63, 1999-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) Paragraph

\textsuperscript{75} FRCP 37.

\textsuperscript{76} E.g., \textit{In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litigation}, 233 F.R.D. 542, 544–45 (N.D. Cal. 5 December 2005).

\textsuperscript{77} E.g., \textit{Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for Southern Dist. of Iowa},

\textsuperscript{78} E.g., \textit{Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver}, 546 F.2d 338, 342 (10th Cir. 1976).
VI USE OF EXPERTS

Plaintiffs may use expert testimony to establish various elements of a private antitrust claim. Expert testimony is often key in certifying a class,\(^{79}\) and on substantive antitrust issues like market or monopoly power, anticompetitive harm, antitrust injury, and damages.

Expert testimony is only admissible if: \(^{80}\)

\(a\) the expert has sufficient specialised knowledge and expertise with respect to the field in question;

\(b\) the methodology and data used to reach the expert’s conclusions are sufficiently reliable; and

\(c\) the expert’s testimony is sufficiently relevant to assist the trier of fact.

Reliability is the most common basis on which expert testimony has been excluded. Several factors are considered to determine whether the proffered testimony is reliable, such as whether the expert’s methodology has been tested, is subject to peer review or is widely accepted by the relevant scientific community.\(^{81}\)

VII CLASS ACTIONS

i Requirements

FRCP 23 governs class actions, where one representative sues on behalf of all other similarly situated plaintiffs. To proceed, a class must be certified under FRCP 23(a) and 23(b).

Rule 23(a) requires that the plaintiff establish that: \(^{82}\)

\(a\) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impracticable;

\(b\) common questions of law and fact to the class;

\(c\) the claims or defences of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defences of the class; and

\(d\) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Additionally, Rule 23(b) requires that the plaintiff establish one of the following: \(^{83}\)

\(a\) separate actions would create a risk of ‘inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class’;

\(b\) separate actions would create a risk of adjudications that ‘would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests’;

\(c\) ‘the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole’; or

\(^{79}\) See Section VII, infra.


\(^{81}\) Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94.

\(^{82}\) FRCP 23(a).

\(^{83}\) FRCP 23(b).
‘questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members’, and ‘a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy’.

Most antitrust class action suits are certified under the fourth provision. Only ‘common’ questions under 23(b)(2) are relevant to the 23(b)(3) predominance analysis. Plaintiffs must establish that damages can be proven with class-wide evidence, that is, the case is susceptible to resolution by common proof, to satisfy 23(b)(3)’s requirement that common issues predominate. In some cases, plaintiffs may have recourse to representative samples to establish class-wide liability. Plaintiffs also must prove class-wide impact – that all class members suffered injury to their business or their property – using common proof. Courts have recently required more rigorous qualitative and quantitative assessments of plaintiffs’ proposed common methodology for analysing class-wide impact and merits-related issues related to class certification. While the depth and breadth of expert testimony and the scope of pre-certification discovery necessary is decided on a case-by-case basis, a ‘rigorous analysis’ of expert opinions is required. Plaintiffs’ ability to meet, rather than an intention to meet, the FRCP 23 requirements must be demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence at the class certification stage. A plaintiff may meet FRCP 23 requirements even if the putative class includes a de minimis number of potentially uninjured parties. Thus, courts generally resolve all factual and legal disputes, including expert disputes, relevant to their certification decision at the time of class certification.

Class representatives may have to establish other threshold requirements, including:

a) that the class is in existence, ascertainable and definable with reasonable specificity;

b) that at least one class plaintiff is able to demonstrate standing.

ii Appointment of class counsel

After certification, the court must appoint class counsel to adequately and fairly represent the interests of the entire class.

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88 In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2009).
89 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432–35;Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553–54.
90 In re Nexium Antitrust Litigation, 777 F.3d 3, 25 (1st Cir. 2015).
91 Some courts have held that that a class is ascertainable when defined by objective criteria that are administratively feasible for the court to identify. Brecher v. Republic of Argentina, 802 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2015); Marcus v. BMW of North America, 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2012).
92 E.g., Prado-Steinman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2000).
93 FRCP 23(g).
iii  Limitations on class-action settlements

Pre-certification settlements
Rule 23 also allows a settlement class to be certified prior to a ruling on class certification for trial purposes. To certify a settlement class, plaintiffs must satisfy the requirements of 23(a) and meet one requirement of 23(b). However, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems, allowing settlement classes to be certified where potential conflicts would defeat class certification for trial.94

Court approval of class settlements required
To prevent abuse by class representatives, Rule 23(e) requires court of approval of class action settlements and voluntarily dismissals. Proposed class-action settlements, voluntary dismissals, or compromise proposals are generally approved if (1) the class meets the 23(a) and 23(b) requirements and (2) the settlement is ‘fair, reasonable, and adequate’.95 Under the latter inquiry, relief under the settlement will be evaluated against the class’s expected relief at trial and its likelihood of success.96 The settlement may be rejected if the court has concerns that the damages are inadequate or concerns regarding the class standing of the plaintiffs.97

Notice
Upon certification, 23(b)(3) requires notice to be provided98 ‘in a reasonable manner’ to all class members who would be bound by the proposal.99 Typically, plaintiffs bear the cost of notice.

VIII  CALCULATING DAMAGES

i  Types of damages cognisable
A fact finder may assess damages where the plaintiff can provide ‘probable and inferential’ proof of a ‘just and reasonable estimate’ of damages.100 Damages cannot be proven through ‘speculation or guesswork’.101 The court will award the plaintiff treble the damages amount. Courts do not allow punitive damage awards because antitrust plaintiffs already receive treble damages.102

94  FRCP 23(b)(3)(d); Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997); e.g., Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 301 (3d Cir. 2011).
95  FRCP 23(e)(2); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621.
96  E.g., Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Visa USA Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2005).
98  FRCP 23(e)(2).
99  FRCP 23(e)(1).
101  Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946); Dopp v. Pritzker, 38 F.3d 1239, 1249 (1st Cir. 1994).
102  McDonald v. Johnson & Johnson Co., 722 F.2d 1370, 1381 (8th Cir. 1983).
ii Calculation of damages

The appropriate measure of damages depends on the type of antitrust violation alleged. Common approaches to damages are as follows:

\( a \) The difference between the plaintiff’s purchase price and the price the purchaser would have paid if not for the violation is a common approach where the alleged effect of the violation is an overcharge, such as cartel claims (e.g., price fixing, bid rigging, market allocations or output limitation agreements) or monopolisation.\(^{103}\)

\( b \) The difference between the plaintiff’s purchase price and the price the purchaser would have paid on the open competitive market is a common measure of damages in tying cases.\(^{104}\) A plaintiff may be entitled to recovery only when the fair market value of the tying and tied products exceeds their combined purchase price.\(^{105}\)

\( c \) The plaintiff’s lost profits is a common measure of damages in cases where the plaintiff is a competitor excluded from the market or is a disfavoured purchaser in a price-discrimination case.\(^{106}\) Damages are usually limited to lost net profits, though some courts may award lost gross profits if lost net profits are negligible.\(^{107}\) When the plaintiff’s business has been almost or completely destroyed, courts may measure damages by lost goodwill or going concern value (i.e., the present value of lost future profits).\(^{108}\)

iii Mitigation

A plaintiff must mitigate damages and cannot recover losses that could have been avoided.\(^{109}\)

iv Disaggregation

A plaintiff may only collect damages for losses caused by the defendant’s antitrust violation. Therefore, the plaintiff must provide the fact finder a basis to disaggregate the losses caused by other factors.\(^{110}\) If it does not, a damage award may be overturned on the grounds it is based on speculation and guesswork.\(^{111}\)

\(^{103}\) E.g., *Howard Hess Dental Labs Inc. v. Dentsply International Inc.*, 424 F.3d 363, 374 (3d Cir. 2005).

\(^{104}\) E.g., *Crossland v. Canteen Corp.*, 711 F.2d 714, 722 (5th Cir. 1983).

\(^{105}\) E.g., *Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp.*, 776 F.2d 665, 672–73 (7th Cir. 1985).

\(^{106}\) E.g., *Trabert & Hoeffer, Inc. v. Piaget Watch Corp.*, 633 F.2d 477, 484 (7th Cir. 1980).

\(^{107}\) Id.


\(^{109}\) E.g., *Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co.*, 753 F.2d 416, 436 (5th Cir. 1985); *Litton Sys Inc. v. AT&T Corp.*, 700 F.2d 785, 820 n.47 (2d Cir. 1983).

\(^{110}\) E.g., *Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic*, 152 F.3d 588, 592–93 (7th Cir. 1998).

\(^{111}\) E.g., *US Football League v. NFL*, 842 F.2d 1355, 1377–79 (2d Cir. 1988).
v Other costs

Section 4 also awards successful plaintiffs court costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees, prejudgment interest on actual damages (awarded at the court’s discretion if the court finds it ‘just in the circumstances’), and mandatory post-judgment interest.\(^{112}\)

IX PASS-ON DEFENCES

Antitrust defendants are barred from asserting pass-on defences against direct purchasers. Therefore, defendants may not introduce evidence that indirect purchasers, rather than the direct purchasers,\(^{113}\) were in fact harmed by the defendants’ antitrust violations. This bar against pass-on defences is analogous to the earlier-noted bar against claims by indirect purchasers, preventing the defensive and offensive use of the pass-on theory to prevent duplicate recovery against defendants.\(^{114}\)

Lower courts, however, have recognised three narrow exceptions to this general ban against pass-on defences and indirect purchaser claims:

a for pre-existing, fixed-quantity, cost-plus contracts, because the plaintiff may show that the indirect purchaser, not the direct purchaser, was harmed by any anticompetitive overcharge;\(^{115}\)

b where the direct purchaser (i.e., the intermediary) is owned or controlled by either the defendant or the indirect purchaser such that the relationship involved ‘such functional economic or other unity between the direct purchaser and either the defendant or the indirect purchaser that there effectively has been only one sale’;\(^{116}\) and

c where the intermediary is a direct participant in a conspiracy with the defendant, such that the intermediary and defendant are then viewed as a single entity from which the plaintiff is a direct purchaser.\(^{117}\)

X FOLLOW-ON LITIGATION

i Prima facie evidence

A government judgment or decree may be \textit{prima facie} evidence in a private antitrust suit if the government judgment or decree is: (1) final, (2) rendered in a civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States, (3) under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws, and (4) is not a consent judgment or decree entered before

\begin{itemize}
\item [\(^{113}\)] \textit{Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Machinery Corp.}, 392 U.S. 481, 491–94 (1968).
\item [\(^{116}\)] \textit{Jewish Hospital Association of Louisville v. Stewart Mechanical Enterprises Inc.}, 628 F.2d 971, 974–75 (6th Cir. 1980).
\item [\(^{117}\)] E.g., \textit{In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation}, 123 F.3d 599, 604 (7th Cir. 1997).
\end{itemize}
any testimony has been taken.  

Additionally, the private plaintiff must be injured in fact by the antitrust violation proven in the government action.  

Guilty pleas to a DoJ indictment generally are admissible as evidence in subsequent private litigation.  

Since DoJ and FTC consent decrees are typically for settlement purposes, they do not constitute an admission by the defendant that the law has been violated.

The *prima facie* effect is given to all matters ‘distinctly put in issue and directly determined’ and ‘necessarily decided’ against the defendant in the government proceeding, but is limited to the period, products and geographical scope adjudicated in the prior government action.

**ii Collateral estoppel**

The collateral estoppel doctrine applies in private antitrust suits. Generally, the doctrine bars the retrying of issues that have already been determined by a court, and gives them conclusive effect in subsequent suits that involve a party to the prior litigation.  

A defendant can use collateral estoppel doctrine defensively to prevent a plaintiff from re-litigating issues previously decided and lost by the government, while a plaintiff can use collateral estoppel offensively to bar a defendant from re-litigating issues lost in prior government actions. Collateral estoppel applies to prior DoJ actions, but not to findings made by the FTC.

Section 213(a) of the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 (ACPERA) offers criminal defendants who participate in the DoJ’s Corporate Leniency Program the opportunity to limit civil liability to single rather than treble damages if they provide ‘satisfactory cooperation’ to civil claimants. To qualify, defendants must provide a full account of relevant facts, furnish all relevant documents, and participate in interviews and depositions reasonably requested by the plaintiff. ACERPA does not affect the plaintiff’s right to recover costs, attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest provided under the Clayton Act.

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118 15 U.S.C. Section 16(a); *Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp.*, 340 U.S. 558, 569 (1951).


120 FRE 410. A guilty plea is not admissible if a plea is later withdrawn or is a nolo contendere (‘no contest’) plea.


124 15 U.S.C. Section 16(a) (‘Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to impose any limitation on the application of collateral estoppel’).


XI PRIVILEGES

i Attorney–client privilege
The attorney–client privilege protects confidential communications between an attorney and client made for the purpose of rendering or receiving legal advice, and applies in the antitrust context to the same extent as in other contexts. The privilege extends to confidential communications between corporate employees and the corporation’s lawyer when those communications are necessary to facilitate the provision of legal advice to the corporation, and covers communications with current and former employees, subsidiaries, and affiliates. It does not extend to communications with a lawyer acting in a business capacity.

ii Waiver of attorney-client privilege
Privilege is waived if the communication is voluntarily disclosed to a third party, unless disclosure is necessary to provide legal advice (e.g., a secretary or an interpreter) or is part of the community-of-interest (or joint defence) privilege. Privilege may be waived if the corporation voluntarily discloses communications to third-party government agencies.

iii The crime-fraud exception
Communications made between clients and their attorneys for the purpose of furthering a current or future crime or fraud, such as an antitrust law violation, are not privileged. To invoke the exception, the moving party must make a prima facie showing that the allegation of a crime or fraud is founded in fact and was intended to further that crime or fraud.

iv Foreign communications and documents
Attorney–client communications that occur in a foreign country or involve foreign attorneys or proceedings and attorney work for foreign proceedings is governed by common law principles. Principles of international comity dictate that the law of the country with the most ‘predominant’ or ‘direct and compelling’ interest in whether those communications should remain confidential applies, unless it would be contrary to public policy.

130 E.g., In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 605–06 (4th Cir. 1997).
132 E.g., In re Allen, 106 F.3d at 600–05.
133 E.g., In re Quest Communications International Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2006).
135 In re Quest, 450 F.3d at 1187–88.
136 E.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933); In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 164–68 (6th Cir. 1986).
137 E.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. at 15.
138 FRE 501.
'predominant' jurisdiction is usually the jurisdiction in which the attorney–client relationship was formed or where relationship was centred at the time the privileged communication was sent. The Hague Evidence Convention allows discovery of foreign evidence, however, Article 11 safeguards privileged and protected evidence under the law of the 'state of execution' or 'state of origin'.

v Attorney work product doctrine

The work product doctrine protects all documents and tangible materials prepared by or for the attorney in anticipation of litigation. Ordinary fact work product includes materials in which the attorney merely records or summarises information, while opinion work product includes materials that reflect the attorney's mental impressions, opinions, judgments or legal conclusions. While opinion work product is virtually immune from discovery, a discovering party may obtain fact work product if it shows substantial need for the work product and undue hardship in obtaining the information from another source. The crime-fraud exception applies to ordinary attorney fact work product, but courts will maintain the immunity given the more sacrosanct opinion work product if the lawyer had no knowledge of the client's crime or fraud.

XII SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES

Federal policy generally favours settlement over continued litigation. FRCP 16 allows federal judges to mandate pretrial conferences among the parties to, inter alia, facilitate settlement, and allows them to impose sanctions on parties for failing to appear or for failing to participate in good faith at such conferences. With the exception of class action settlements, courts typically accept a party's stipulation to settle without review. However, FRCP 23 requires that proposed class-action settlements be reviewed and approved by the court only if they are 'fair, reasonable, and adequate' as class section settlements affect the rights of all class members. A defendant's unaccepted offer of settlement to a class representative does not moot the plaintiff's claim. Due process requirements – giving notice to the absent class members and holding a hearing in which any such absent class member who wishes to may object to the proposed settlement – must be met prior to settlement approval.

140 Id.
141 FRCP 26(b)(2); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
142 E.g., 805 F.2d at 163.
143 E.g., 329 U.S. at 513.
144 FRCP 26(b)(3)(A).
145 E.g., 805 F.2d at 163-64.
146 FRCP 16(a)(5), (f)(1).
147 FRCP 23(e).
149 FRCP 23(e).
XIII ARBITRATION

Federal policy favours arbitration and federal antitrust claims arising out of both international and domestic transactions generally may be arbitrated. Arbitration clauses are construed broadly and refuse to recognize attempts by parties to limit the statutory remedies and procedures available to arbitrators, invalidating, for example, portions of arbitration agreements where the parties attempted to waive rights to treble damages or class or consolidated actions. In the context of class actions, however, the defendant's arbitration rights may be deemed waived if it seeks to compel arbitration only after the class is certified and extensive discovery has occurred. Also, arbitrators may not impose class arbitration on parties unless it is contractually permissible. The Supreme Court also made express arbitration clauses trump class-action rights, even in antitrust cases.

XIV INDEMNIFICATION AND CONTRIBUTION

i Joint and several liability
Under the doctrine of joint and several liability, each guilty defendant is liable for all the damages caused by the conduct of the entire conspiracy, not just those attributable to its own conduct. Antitrust co-conspirators can be held jointly and severally liable for damages predicated on sales by members of the conspiracy and damages caused by entities outside the conspiracy caused by the conspiracy.

ii No right to contribution
An antitrust defendant may not seek contribution from other participants in the anticompetitive scheme. Combined with joint and several liability for antitrust damages among defendants, the absence of the right to seek contribution from others has important practical consequences for defendants in their settlement strategies.

151 E.g., JLM Industries, Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2004).
153 Healy v. Cox Communications, Inc., 790 F.3d 1112, 1118–21 (10th Cir. 2015).
157 Id. at 639–46.
iii Indemnification
Most courts prohibit a defendant from seeking indemnification from other participants of an anticompetitive conspiracy, treating contribution and indemnification analogously. However, indemnification may be available to ‘an innocent actor whose liability stems from some legal relationship with the truly culpable party’.

XV ENFORCEMENT OF MONETARY JUDGMENTS AGAINST FOREIGN COMPANIES
Monetary judgments issued by US courts generally become enforceable promptly after entry, and taking an appeal from the judgment does not ordinarily stay enforcement. To stay enforcement pending appeal, the losing defendant (or ‘judgment debtor’) must ordinarily post a bond for the full amount of the monetary judgments. Enforcement of monetary judgments in US federal courts is governed by FRCP 69.

The principal device contemplated by that rule is the ‘writ of execution’ (i.e., an order authorising the US marshals to seize and sell property of the judgment debtor within the territory of the district court). The holder of a monetary judgment (or ‘judgment creditor’) may register the judgment in other district courts, in which case the judgment is treated as though it had issued from the court in which it has been registered. Rule 69 authorises proceedings in aid of enforcement, including post-judgment discovery as to the judgment debtor’s assets. The US Supreme Court recently held that such discovery may extend to assets held abroad because the judgment creditor may be able to secure execution in the countries where the assets are held.

US courts generally do not have authority to execute against assets outside the US. However, the enforcement law of the state of New York authorises orders requiring

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160 FRCP 62(a).

161 FRCP 62(d).

162 Judgments awarding injunctions are enforced by the issuing court through its power to hold a party that violates its orders in contempt. See 18 U.S.C. § 401.


167 Id.
any judgment debtor or third party over which it has personal jurisdiction to bring money or personal property belonging to the judgment debtor into the state for execution.\textsuperscript{168} The constitutionality of this approach remains an open question.\textsuperscript{169}

XVI FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK

Private antitrust litigation continues to be active in the United States, both in class action litigation for consumers against companies that have engaged in anticompetitive conduct and for private companies challenging the practices of other companies as anticompetitive. Additionally, follow-on litigation to government enforcement action, particularly in cartel matters, continues to be a large part of US antitrust litigation.

US courts continuously evaluate the scope of the antitrust laws and the legal framework in which plaintiffs may bring private litigation. Likewise, the appellate courts continue to interpret \textit{Bell Atlantic v. Twombly}\textsuperscript{170} and clarify what allegations are sufficient to create a ‘reasonably grounded expectation that discovery will reveal relevant evidence of an illegal agreement’ to survive dismissal.\textsuperscript{171}

The Supreme Court dismissed the sole antitrust case it had pending for the current term, but it is expected to address general litigation issues of potential relevance to antitrust disputes, including whether the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters authorises service of process by mail, standards for meeting the injury-in-fact and proximate causation requirements for Article III standing, and pleading standards for alleging exceptions to the immunity of foreign sovereigns (as well as their agencies, organs and instrumentalities).\textsuperscript{172}

Over the past year the US Supreme Court has rendered several decisions concerning the certification of putative classes of plaintiffs. Notably, it found that in Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) actions, a representative sample – such as statistical averages – is admissible to establish class-wide liability.\textsuperscript{173} It is unclear whether this standard applies to other statutory claims, such as violations of the antitrust laws. Also, the Court held that a defendant’s

\begin{itemize}
\item[]\textsuperscript{169} \textit{Koehler}, 12 N.Y.3d at 544-45 (Smith, J., dissenting) (noting potential constitutional objections).
\item[]\textsuperscript{170} 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
\item[]\textsuperscript{171} \textit{Evergreen Partnering Group, Inc. v. Forrest}, 720 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2013); \textit{Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm't}, 592 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2010).
\item[]\textsuperscript{173} \textit{Tyson Foods, Inc.}, 136 S. Ct. 1036.
\end{itemize}
unaccepted offer of settlement does not moot the plaintiff’s claim. Finally, the Court determined that technical violations of a statutory right do not automatically satisfy the standing requirement of injury-in-fact.

Further developments in class action litigation and substantive antitrust law have come from the federal appellate courts this year. For example, in the context of settling patent infringement disputes between generic and brand-name drug manufacturers, the First Circuit joined the Third Circuit in holding that non-monetary reverse ‘payments’ – including agreements not to market an authorised generic drug – are subject to antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason analysis established in *FTC v. Actavis, Inc.*, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). Moreover, it found that the existence of an antitrust violation is different from the question of antitrust injury. The Second Circuit found that the doctrine of international comity immunises conduct of foreign companies which is compelled by foreign governments and at the same time is prohibited by US law. Finally, the Third Circuit provided guidance on the ‘numerosity’ requirement for class certification. The panel held that considerations of the late stage of the proceedings have no role to play in the assessment of numerosity, and that the district court needed to closely consider whether a group of roughly 20 claimants where three claimants accounted for the vast bulk of the damages claims could be managed through joinder of the claimants rather than through a class action.

The development of the law on the procedures for bringing antitrust actions, including the seeming relaxation of some of the stringent pleading and class certification standards, as well as the continued enforcement by the federal antitrust agencies against cartel activities and monopolisation across industries, virtually assures that private litigation will remain a robust and complex area of activity in the United States.

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174 *Campbell-Ewald Co.*, 136 S. Ct. 663.
178 *Animal Sci. Prods.*, 837 F.3d 175.
179 *In re Modafinil Antitrust Litig.*, 837 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2016).
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